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This project uses stakeholder evidence from semi-structured interviews to analyze the 
relative effectiveness of an oil company’s stated “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) 
initiatives in a new, Arctic host community. Specifically, this project analyzes the 
outcomes of StatoilHydro initiatives to date in Hammerfest, Norway, where the Snøhvit 
(Snow White) natural gas project began production in 2007. It gauges the ability of 
“socially responsible” approaches to development to internalize negative externalities and 
promote positive “spin-offs.” Arctic countries are increasingly prioritizing petroleum 
development. The convergence of dramatic climate change, increasing energy demands, 
and high energy prices has made the Arctic an alluring frontier for the oil industry and 
Arctic governments. Small Arctic communities are increasingly playing host to large 
energy projects with the potential for dramatic cultural, social, environmental, and 
economic upheaval, but also economic growth and increased human capital. In this case 
study, CSR initiatives resulted in a broader accounting of social costs and benefits, an 
outcome that better internalized externalities, and pareto-improving trades between 
stakeholders and industry. 
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A convergence of rapidly expanding global energy demands, high oil and gas 
prices and newly accessible reserves because of climate change is ushering forth 
unprecedented Arctic petroleum exploration and development. One result is that Arctic 
communities are increasingly interfacing with large energy companies, increasing the 
potential for dramatic cultural, social, environmental, and economic upheaval, but also 
the potential for economic growth and prosperity.1 
As petroleum companies expand operations in the Arctic2 and other peripheral 
regions, they confront a series of unique challenges, and their activities pose certain risks 
for new host communities. Recent events in Alaska’s North Slope indicate some of the 
conflicts that may arise. Shell’s plans to develop offshore gas projects in the Beaufort Sea 
were thwarted by some members of the Inupiat community, through federal courts, who 
feared a particular risk to their subsistence whaling practice. Other factions of the 
community ardently support oil and gas activities, citing an opportunity for economic 
development in a region with few other opportunities.  
Throughout the Arctic, companies like Shell contend challenging physical and 
social environments. In spite of moderating temperatures and retreating sea ice, the Arctic 
remains a harrowing environment within which to operate. Human and environmental 
                                                
1 Arctic Council, “2008 Oil and Gas Assessment.” Arctic Council (accessed 1.23.08) 
2 Bevanger, Lars. "Norway's Arctic Oil Bonanza." BBC. August 13, 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4776543.stm (accessed 11.01.2006) and Mouawad, Jad. “Oil 
tensions for Natives in Alaska,” International Herald Tribune. December 4, 2007. 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/12/04/business/alaska.php (accessed 12.4.2007) 
2 
safety is difficult to ensure. The Arctic environment is fragile and slow to repair itself 
after catastrophic oil spills or damage from heavy machinery (Patin 1999, Short et al. 
2007). Companies are also confronting small, isolated communities - often with entirely 
or predominantly indigenous populations - that combine subsistence with a market 
economy to varying degrees. These communities, already vulnerable under new 
environmental challenges, must now confront the impacts from a mobile and exogenous 
labor force, industrial development, energy politics, and an influx of new wealth. Though 
oil and gas production is regularly associated with wealth production, it has routinely 
proven disastrous for rural communities in other parts of the world when they are ill-
prepared for rapid changes and unaccustomed to large-scale industrial activity (Ross 
1999, Corden and Neary 1982, Gelb 1988, Karl 1997). 
Information and preparedness can improve the outcomes for stakeholders. In a 
rapidly changing Arctic, scientific information helps communities adapt and prepare for 
climate change. Similarly, in a changing socio-economic environment spurred by 
expanding oil and gas activity, communities need timely and accurate information to 
develop strategies for community resiliency, the capacity to demand best practices from 
industry, and to generate “win-win” outcomes. 
Industry also has an opportunity to promote positive outcomes, and is in an 
advantageous position to do so. “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR) initiatives by 
firms world-wide have acknowledged the risks of unrestrained development, and the 
responsibility of corporations to minimize them. The World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development defines CSR very generally as, “the continuing commitment by 
3 
business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving 
the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community 
and society at large.” CSR can therefore be applied to issues ranging from human rights 
to the environment, but certain aspects of CSR are universal. CSR is always characterized 
by voluntary and “beyond compliance” measures taken by industry to reduce harm from 
its business. CSR is becoming increasingly normalized in global business, and 
increasingly institutionalized through UN initiatives like the Global Compact, by the 
European Commission and voluntarily by businesses. 
The rhetoric of CSR, however, does not always match the reality (Boasson and 
Wettestad 2007, Frynas 2005, Margolis and Walsh 2001). Its loose and ambiguous nature 
is fodder for detractors. On the other hand, strict regulation of oil and gas activities, 
especially in the Arctic, is oftentimes lacking – the result of “soft-law” and weak 
institutions (Offerdal, 2007). This makes CSR policy, its incorporation of local 
stakeholders, and its potential to promote positive outcomes, even more important to 
study. 
The challenges and opportunities are clear. In spite of documented risks, climate 
change, energy conservation, and renewable energy development, the demand for oil and 
gas will continue expanding for decades to come.3 This demand will bring oil and gas 
development to more Arctic communities, and along with it will come the potential for 
socio-cultural upheaval as well as opportunities for wealth and increased development. 
                                                
3 Energy Information Administration. “International Energy Outlook 2007” Energy Information 
Administration. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/oil.html (accessed 1.11.2008) 
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The challenge for communities is to respond appropriately to preserve sovereignty, 
health, and economic stability, whether their economies are subsistence or market-based. 
This paper examines the small fishing community of Hammerfest in northern 
Norway. Hammerfest now plays host to an advanced Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
facility and is the new capital of what has become Norway’s “Arctic Energy Province.” 
Finnmark County, where Hammerfest is located, was until recently known best for its 
out-migration and declining fishing industry. Therefore, some general questions inspire 
this project: What is the fate of small communities in the wake of such dramatic 
development? Would Hammerfest streets be paved in gold, or would pollution spoil the 
remnants of its fishing industry? Would large industry trammel the concerns of local 
citizens, or would sustainable solutions be found to reinvigorate the community’s 
economy and livelihood? To answer these questions, this project examines the case of 
Hammerfest and the “Snøhvit” (Snow White) LNG facility through the theoretical lens of 
externalities, or the unintended consequences of any business practice, including both 
positive “spin-offs” for the local economy as well as negative ones like pollution. 
StatoilHydro - the company at the center of this paper – is an important 
organization to examine for several reasons. Its operations in the Barents Sea represent 
the first petroleum development in northern Norwegian waters. This reverses a 
longstanding Norwegian “no drill” policy in waters above 62 degrees North latitude 
(Lind and Mackay 1979).4 As a corporation, StatoilHydro has clearly stated aims to 
increasingly explore and develop Arctic waters as its North Sea oil production continues 
                                                
4 And the Minister of Petroleum and Energy, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/Oil-and-
Gas/Norways-oil-history-in-5-minutes.html?id=440538 (accessed 06.07.2008) 
5 
to decline.5 The corporation is already involved in Canadian oil sands, recent Chukchi 
Sea leases, and in the North Atlantic near Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.6 StatoilHydro 
also has long-stated and evolving public commitments to CSR. For these reasons, the 
corporation’s experience provides a useful example of the challenges facing industry in 
the North, and the potential outcomes of CSR in practice. 
This project recognizes that StatoilHydro has a highly evolved CSR strategy and 
is considered an industry leader in this respect. But it questions how effective these 
policies can be with respect to the externalities in Hammerfest and their impacts on local 
stakeholders. This project is therefore designed to answer a specific question: Was CSR 
able to mitigate negative externalities and promote positive externalities associated with 
Snøhvit’s development? “Effectiveness” is measured by considering whether Pareto-
improvement trade-offs resulted from CSR, and analyzing the alternatives, including 
CSR in relation to economic and command-and-control incentives. To assess the 
economic efficiency of CSR, this paper further attempts to estimate whether or not the 
marginal private costs of CSR, to StatoilHydro, approximate the marginal social benefits 
gained by stakeholders. This cannot be done quantitatively here, but is nonetheless 
assessed qualitatively throughout the paper. 
After a “Background” chapter (Chapter 2) including a review of important terms 
and concepts, with special attention to CSR, the framework for this study is further 
elaborated (Chapter 3). This includes a detailed discussion of the analytical foundations 
of the paper including Stakeholder Theory, Externalities and Actor Network Theory 
                                                
5 Statoil. FACTS 2007; StatoilHydro, Going North, Sustainable Development 2007 
6 StatoilHydro, Going North, Sustainable Development 2007 
6 
(ANT). Chapter 4 reviews the political economy of oil and gas in Norway, including a 
discussion of the regulatory regimes governing the industry and a consideration of CSR’s 
place within this context. Methodology is discussed in Chapter 5, followed by a chapter 
(Chapter 6) devoted to each of the stakeholders identified for this project and results. 
Separate sections include pertinent background and an analysis of outcomes resulting 
from CSR policies for each of the stakeholders. The final chapters consider a discussion 
of the results, implications and limitations to the research, while Appendix A lists 




Hammerfest Norway existed without oil and gas for over a century, and at times 
prospered. Only very recently has petroleum development taken place, which provides a 
laboratory for observing how progressive CSR policies were developed, implemented, 
and how they worked. 
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate Social Responsibility is an increasingly scrutinized phenomenon 
(Figure 2.1). It is both lauded for its potential to benefit communities, and castigated for 
its ambiguity and difficult-to-quantify efficacy. For example, oil companies that 
contribute to Habitat for Humanity, or support a neighborhood athletic field, might 
consider themselves leaders in CSR. Similarly, a company – British Petroleum most 
notably – might heavily invest in marketing that emphasizes their environmental 
stewardship or work in sustainable energy projects.  
But if, at the same time, the company continues to pollute through day-to-day 
operations, or its negligence leads to a serious oil spill or a refinery explosion, then 
detractors can dismiss such claims as mere “greenwashing.” StatoilHydro invests in 
offshore wind farms and hydrogen filling stations, but it also drills for oil in fragile Arctic 
waters and politically unstable countries. Yet StatoilHydro considers itself a CSR 
industry leader. These uncertainties continue to plague CSR analysts and policy-makers 
who shape the ongoing debate. They also lend credence to CSR detractors. 
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Figure 2.1 Articles with “Corporate Social Responsibility” as a keyword 
determined by EconLit per decade.  
2.1.1 The Business Case and the Problem of “Greenwashing” 
CSR has gained acceptance, even among large corporations, because it allows for 
a level of self-regulation - a trend that has also been increasingly institutionalized in a 
global business environment – and a potentially more efficient means of “damage 
control” than more heavy-handed government intervention. But consensus on CSR as a 
competitive advantage is still lacking, and evidence of “greenwashing” still persists 
(Laufer 2003). 
Milton Friedman, as early as 1970, quipped that “the social responsibility of 
companies is to maximize profit.” Following in this vein, much of the CSR literature has 
devoted itself to examining the relationship between CSR and profitability (Margolis et al 
9 
2007, Wu 2006, Orlitzky et. al 2003, McGuire 1998, Alexander and Buchholz 1978). 
Much of this research underlined CSR’s incompatibility with profit-maximization and 
free-market capitalism, disparaging it as needless and inefficient corporate 
mismanagement – a mis-allocation of precious resources.  
Regardless of profitability, CSR is continues to be criticized. Jedrzej George 
Frynas (2005) argues that, while oil and gas companies are leaders in CSR - responsible 
for $500 million in community development projects in 2001 alone - much of the money 
is ill-spent and ineffectively used. Behind the Mask: The Real Face of CSR, a report by 
Christian Aid, lambastes CSR as ineffective chicanery at best (2004). 
Frynas (2005), however, isolates a number of motivating factors for CSR 
implementation: obtaining a competitive advantage, maintaining a stable work 
environment, managing external pressures, and keeping employees happy. He suggests 
that these factors trump more genuine development concerns and generally undermine 
development projects. An example would be schools that were constructed by an oil 
company, but not staffed. He concludes that the “business case” is the primary impetus 
for petroleum industry CSR, and argues that there is an “incompatibility of corporate 
objectives with developmental objectives.” This last point is echoed by Margolis and 
Walsh (2001), Gulbrandsen and Moe (2005), and Ite (2004).  
Ironically, whether advocating for, or criticizing CSR, it is almost universally 
agreed upon that a “business case” for CSR is imperative. While this undermines the idea 
of any altruistic motivation behind CSR, it forces a consideration of non-market 
valuation, like the indirect value of ecological or cultural service flows. Portney (2005) 
10 
and Esty (2005) both acknowledge opportunity of CSR to account for a greater breadth of 
costs and benefits that generate socially efficient outcomes in theory, but also 
acknowledge the lack of empirical evidence. This thesis addresses both the business case 
of CSR through its analysis of cost and benefits to StatoilHydro with respect to CSR, and 
provides empirical evidence of CSR outcomes in practice. 
2.2 CSR and Extractive Industries 
Much of the CSR literature focuses on extractive industries. This is in part 
because of its potential for severe environmental externalities and negative impacts on 
communities. Lars Gulbrandsen and Arild Moe (2007) considered CSR in a case study of 
oil producer BP in Azerbaijan. Their case study, in contrast to the more theoretical 
approach of Frynas, allowed for the peculiarities of the host government, its laws, 
regulations, and history, to be considered in the context of a company’s CSR campaign. 
Similarly, it allowed for more time to dwell on the specifics of the company’s efforts – 
positive or negative.  
The authors note several shortcomings in BP’s CSR practice in Azerbaijan. But 
they also note major shifts in BP’s strategy, from small-scale projects to macro-level 
causes like financial transparency. Their study also highlights the institutional 
shortcomings in the Azeri government that made CSR difficult to implement successfully 
– an important issue in all aspects of development aid, which also raises the broader 
question of the role of corporations versus national governments in providing social 
services – a topic largely beyond the scope of this paper. In spite of shortcomings, 
however, Gulbrandsen and Moe (2007) consider BP’s efforts a model for extractive 
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industries around the world. What the authors failed to consider, however, was how BP’s 
CSR campaign altered the situation for local stakeholders who are less enfranchised than 
government officials.  
Recent literature continues to examine the role of petroleum and mining 
companies in developing countries (Akpan 2006, Ite 2004, and Kapelus 2002). Special 
consideration of the “resource curse” is typical, outcomes are largely negative, and 
positive results qualified (Anderson and Bieniaszewska 2006). In all cases, CSR and 
externalities are not central to the study.  
A small body of literature, however, has noted positive CSR outcomes for 
stakeholders and this includes examples from the extractive industries. May (1999) 
asserts that a successful outcome in Peru, between local stakeholders and Shell, was a 
direct consequence of thorough stakeholder analysis and dialogue (an approach 
StatoilHydro advocates). This lends credence to the potential for CSR to result in positive 
outcomes, especially if it was successful in a less developed country compared to a 
progressive country like Norway. 
This thesis contributes to the literature by focusing implicitly on the stakeholder 
analysis of CSR within the context of externalities. It therefore addresses both the lack 
the theoretical affect of CSR on externalities by collecting empirical evidence based on 
stakeholder evidence, and additionally considers the efficiency of outcomes. By 
analyzing the costs and benefits of CSR in Hammerfest, further contributes to the premise 
of a business case for CSR. 
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2.3 Gaps in CSR Literature 
The literature to date provides little stakeholder analysis, and little consideration 
of the relationship between CSR and externalities. This is surprising considering the 
emphasis on stakeholder outreach in CSR, and the supposed goals of CSR in reducing 
undue harm to stakeholders. Margolis et al (2007), among others (Hay et al 2005, Portney 
2005), acknowledge that empirical evidence is lacking regarding CSR’s ability to affect 
externalities. This remains a frontier for CSR scholars, partly because CSR is difficult to 
quantify. In the meantime, the literature continues to dwell on narrow definitions of CSR 
that underscore a voluntary, “beyond compliance” concept that is incompatible with 
economics and profit-maximization, and still labors the question of whether or not 
corporations “should” practice CSR (Portney 2005).  
This paper attempts to address some of these shortcomings. It emphasizes the role 
of CSR in addressing the negative and unintended consequences of business practice, 
while considering its potential to foster positive externalities at the same time. It has been 
clearly demonstrated, however, that CSR can take many forms, many of which result in 
very little besides corporate “greenwashing.” Modern CSR research must now provide a 
more precise framework of analysis, while not necessarily quantitative, and one that can 





Stakeholder information was collected and analyzed using Actor Network Theory 
to measure the perceptions of each key stakeholder group as to the efficacy of CSR in 
affecting externalities. Other sources of information including websites and publications 
are used to test and compliment the stakeholder information. This section describes the 
nesting of different analytical tools utilized to examine outcomes in Hammerfest. This 
thesis analyzes Corporate Social Responsibility with respect to its ability to mitigate the 
negative externalities associated with petroleum development in small communities, and 
to stimulate and bolster positive outcomes.  
3.1 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory is a cornerstone of CSR. Its place in business management has 
increasingly become de rigeur and represents the latest evolution in socially responsible 
business practice. Corporate Social Performance (CSP), it is argued, hinges on well-
developed and effectively implemented stakeholder analyses (Clarkson 1995). But 
defining critical stakeholders can be challenging (Downey 2002, Vos 2003). Post et al 
(2002: 8) suggest that stakeholders in a corporation are, “the individuals and 
constituencies that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth-creating 
capacity and activities, and that are therefore its potential beneficiaries and/or risk 
bearers.” The different stakeholders of a single firm share common risks: “a possibility of 
gaining benefits or experiencing losses or harm, as a result of corporate operations” (Post 
14 
et al 2002: 8). This definition emphasizes both the risks and benefits to stakeholders from 
industry making it important for the Hammerfest case study because stakeholders there 
share in the risks and rewards of Snøhvit unevenly. 
Kochan and Rubenstein (2000) are more specific, citing three criteria for 
identifying “significant” stakeholders: 
• They supply resources important to the firm’s success 
• They place something of value “at risk” – their own welfare is directly affected by 
the firm and outcomes of a project. 
 
• They have “sufficient power” to affect the firm’s performance, favorably or 
unfavorably. 
 
The Hammerfest case study conducted here favors the middle criterion when 
isolating stakeholders in researching for this project. With respect to the first criterion, 
Kochan and Rubenstein (2000) seem to ignore disenfranchised and passive groups at risk 
from negative externalities. With regards to the third, the stakeholders in Hammerfest 
vary in their abilities to influence StatoilHydro, but in general, significant asymmetries in 
“power” characterize stakeholders in Hammerfest, compared to industry. This project 
proceeds under the premise that CSR might transfer some of this power to local 
stakeholders. 
Importantly, stakeholder theory also emphasizes that firm financial performance 
depends on positive “stakeholder management” – or the successful cooperation with 
stakeholders, and not just company shareholders. In this manner, stakeholder input can 
reveal social costs unaddressed otherwise by a firm’s cost-benefit analysis. And while 
detractors – adherents to the Friedman doctrine of ‘profit maximization equals social 
15 
responsibility’ - continue to question stakeholder theory’s role in business management, it 
is increasingly normalized, and makes an appropriate framework from which to analyze 
CSR in Hammerfest. 
 
3.2 Actor Network Theory 
This thesis uses a subset of Stakeholder Theory called Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT). ANT allows for a systematic analysis of how stakeholders perceived CSR as it 
was implemented by StatoilHydro in Hammerfest. It also allows for an analysis of how 
stakeholders reacted to CSR and how outcomes developed (Egels 2005). These stages, 
including the last stage, “mutiny,” develop cyclically until the focal actor (StatoilHydro) 
and stakeholders achieve a level of understanding. ANT stages include: 
• problematisation, in which the focal actor (Statoil in this project) formulates the 
definition that the actor wants to see adopted. 
 
• intressement, in which the focal actor attempts, via a series of processes, to lock 
other actors into the defined roles. 
 
• enrolment, or when the other actors accept their assigned roles. 
 
• mobilization, or when the focal actor attempts to mobilize all actors involved in 
the problematisation to play their assigned roles. 
 
• mutiny, or when actors refuse to assume the role assigned in problematisation. 
 
Qualitative methodology, as employed here, is consistent with ANT-based 
research (Egels 2005). Each stage is observable in the Snøhvit case study, though they are 
heretofore undocumented. Each individual stage can be scrutinized by addressing the 
following questions: How was CSR defined and implemented? How did different actors 
respond? What was the final outcome to date?  
16 
An example of ANT analysis is how a stakeholder responds to the advent of a new 














Stakeholders, according to ANT, will agree to the CSR initiatives set forth and 
defined by StatoilHydro after a series of industry-led efforts to define the scope of CSR. 
Carbon reduction efforts, for example, are a major component of StatoilHydro’s CSR 
campaign, even if the threat from climate change poses less concern to the average local 
stakeholder (though it was a major concern for environmental NGOs). Economic 
development and local employment was a positive outcome that StatoilHydro loudly 
1. Problematisation. The focal actor 
shapes the discourse for the 
stakeholder (SH) like: “Positive 





2. Intressement. The focal 
actor entices SH goodwill 
through public statements or 
publications like “sustainability 
reports” 
3. Enrolment. SHs might passively 
accept the terms of CSR as they have 
been laid out - dialogue that incorporates 
SH input for example. With SHs 
approval, development can proceed 
smoothly 
Mutiny! SHs reject 
outcomes and 
challenge industry 
with new terms  
4. Mobilization. SHs 
agree with conditions 
of development and 
“permit” development 
Figure 3.1 CSR progression in a community using ANT 
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trumpeted, even though all indicators pointed to an exogenous, fly-in-fly-out labor supply 
and contracts for non-local suppliers. 
If local stakeholders resist at any point along the ANT trajectory, they are 
engaging in “mutiny.”7 Fishermen, as will be discussed more thoroughly in Section 6.2, 
resisted elements of Statoil’s “enrolment” efforts, even while accepting the premise of 
petroleum development in the Barents Sea. The objections would have significant 
impacts on the nature of development however, and lessen the harm fishermen 
experienced. On the other hand, local business leaders mutinied too, and forced 
considerable revisions of CSR policies that eventually led to increased gains for 
community developers. 
This study goes further, however, by considering CSR through the lens of property 
rights, transaction costs, and especially positive and negative externalities like those 
described above. It uses stakeholder theory, and ANT in particular, to help analyze CSR’s 
overall efficacy in affecting externalities. 
3.3 Externalities 
In this thesis it is hypothesized that CSR has the potential to dampen the harmful 
effects of negative externalities, while simultaneously multiplying the benefits stemming 
from positive externalities. But to understand the potential relationship between CSR and 
externalities it is first necessary to specify the meaning and importance of externalities. 
                                                
7 An unfortunate label considering stakeholders’ right, and perhaps obligation to consider the terms of local 
development and its impact on the community. But it nonetheless suggest a deliberate breaking from an 
industry-led initiative. 
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Economists consider externalities a market failure, or among a set of 
circumstances that broadly represent a market’s inability to distribute scarce resources 
efficiently.  
It is assumed that private actors make economic decisions based on their 
estimation of the costs and benefits that would accrue to them. These private costs and 
benefits are accurately reflected in market transactions and results in market prices that 
efficiently allocate resources. When there are spill-over effects on others who are not 
party to the transaction, however, these “external” costs and benefits are not considered 
in the economic decision making of the private actors. The market price and allocation 
are therefore not efficient. 
Pollution, for example, is produced in quantities beyond what is “socially 
optimal” because the polluter does not incur the “true” costs of pollution to the 
environment or human health. The polluter’s costs, in this case, are “externalized” to the 
general public (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005). Some economists argue that externalities 
can be “internalized” by assigning costs through taxes or other economic incentives. A 
firm would consider the cost of polluting alongside the costs of other inputs like capital 
and labor, and accordingly adjust output downwards. 
With respect to pollution (which is a risk associated with Snøhvit through CO2 
from the well-stream, gas flaring, and its gas power plant emissions) the “optimal level” 
of pollution from an economic efficiency standpoint would be found at the intersection of 

















The marginal damage function, which represents the costs associated with 
damage from one additional unit of pollution, has a slope that increases at an increasing 
rate (Kahn 2005). Thus for every additional unit of pollution, soot from gas flaring for 
example, damage costs associated with this unit increase. The marginal abatement cost 
curve, on the other hand, has a slope that decreases at a decreasing rate, suggesting that 
for every additional unit of pollution that is removed from the environment, it is 
increasingly expensive. Easy, cost-efficient attempts to reduce pollution remove large 
amounts of pollution. But when moving in the direction of zero pollution, the costs 







Figure 3.2 Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) and Marginal Damage 
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From a broader social perspective, another way to interpret Figure 3.2 is that 
externalities will be produced at a point where marginal social benefit is in equilibrium 
with marginal social costs. This also defines Pareto optimality, the point at which 
resources cannot be reallocated to increase one person’s well-being (utility), without 
reducing the well-being of someone else (Hanley et al 1997). In Figure 3.3, a negative 
externality is internalized by accounting for greater marginal social costs than marginal 
private costs. Accounting for the greater social costs in this manner (difficult to do 
quantify it is important to note) results in a more efficient reallocation of resources, and 




Figure 3.3 Marginal Private Benefit (MPB) and Marginal Social Cost 
(MSC) Curves 
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less pollution. On the other hand, positive externalities, like greater economic 
development in Hammerfest for example, are best encouraged by more accurately 
accounting for the marginal social benefit created from development initiatives (see 
Figure 3.4).  
But how these costs and benefits are considered is yet another crux, and hinges in 
part on how property rights are assigned. 
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Figure 3.4 Marginal Social Benefits (MSB) Augmenting Positive 
Externalities 
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3.3.1 Property Rights and Other Contributing Factors 
Hanna (2001) makes clear that property rights are an essential element of resource 
management. She also asserts that unambiguous property rights “resolve the problem of 
externalities” (2001). In the case of Hammerfest, a complicating factor is the open access 
resources in question, which makes property rights ambiguous.  
Open access resources and public goods, like the Hammerfest airshed or Barents 
Sea itself, are characterized by non-rivalry and non-excludability. While StatoilHydro has 
subsurface mineral rights that it paid for, and can exclude other energy companies from 
exploiting those resources, it needed to deliver the wellstream to its LNG facility by 
pipeline over the Barents Sea floor. The sea floor is also a valuable resource for 
fishermen who depend on its productivity. Damage from an undersea pipeline might 
negatively impact fishermen, or restrict access to their fisheries, but fishermen’s rights to 
exclude StatoilHydro from this resource are also in question. 
In a different manner, pollution from gas flaring affects the air quality of 
Hammerfest, and thus the well-being of its citizens. Soot that settled on grazing lands in 
August 2008 might directly impact the health of Sámi reindeer, and harm the Sámi 
economy. Finally, CO2 emissions from both flaring and the gas power plant are 
“transferable” externalities (Hanna 2001) that impact anything from small island states 
and Australian farmers to Arctic ecosystems.  
The monetary value of these impacts have not been quantified, and nor has the 
service flow of clean air to Hammerfest citizens, their health, or their tourist industry. 
The impact of StatoilHydro’s industrial facility on Hammerfest’s “viewshed” has also not 
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been quantified. In these latter cases, the public “bad” - or when the loss suffered by one 
person from poor air quality does not reduce the loss suffered by another - will be 
oversupplied by the market (Hanley et al 1997). This is in accordance with Hanna’s 
observation that “indirect uses,” like ecological services for example, are less quantifiable 
than direct uses (like fish landings or barrels of oil), and therefore more prone to 
externalities (2001). 
Separately, it is clear that the marginal cost of CO2 reduction on the part of 
StatoilHydro is expensive. Initial carbon capture and storage (CCS) expenditures were 
relatively small (and even necessary for LNG),8 but additional CO2 reduction from the 
gas plant is less feasible, more expensive, and is not being pursued. Economic incentives 
in the form of a carbon tax have already been initiated in Norway, and provide one 
disincentive to emissions. Carbon taxes started in 1991 now equal 50 dollars per ton of 
CO2.
9 Tax incentives are difficult to calibrate accurately, however, and externalities can 
persist even after their enactment (Kahn 2005). 
It is still unclear, therefore, where the “optimum” equilibrium lies, and how much 
pollution is tolerable by Hammerfest, Norway, or the international community. With 
respect to Hammerfest stakeholders and CSR’s role, additional consideration of property 
rights and transaction costs are necessary.  
                                                
8 For Snøhvit, the investment costs for the CO2 pipeline, well and compressor train investments were 
calculated to be about ? 150 million (Kårstad, 2002). At the same period, the total investments for phase 1 
of the project were calculated to be about ? 2.9 billion, and all phases, ? 4.3billion (Heiskanen 2006). 
9 Stoichevski, William. “Norway: Carbon tax permitting oil-industry growth,” Scandinavian Oil and Gas 
Magazine. http://www.scandoil.com/moxie-bm2/carbon/technology_carbon/norway-carbon-tax-permitting-
oil-industry-growth.shtml (accessed 09.01.2008) 
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Daniel Bromley (1991) defines property as a “benefit stream” and a property right 
as a “claim to a benefit stream that the state will agree to protect through the assignment 
of duty to others who may covet, or somehow interfere with, the benefit stream” (2001: 
2). Bromley therefore favors a perspective in which property rights are based on social 
contracts. A. Allan Schmid (1995) emphasizes a triadic relationship between individuals 
with respect to a resource (versus between an individual and a resource). As such, 
“owners act as they wish and, if rights are exchangeable, listen for bids from non-owners 
to do otherwise” (1995: 46). Externalities, according to Schmid, do not disappear, but 
their direction, and therefore damage or benefit, changes depending on the “distribution 
of ownership” (1995).  
The social contract inherent in property rights (Coase 1960, Bromley 2001, 
Schmid 1995) has important implications for Hammerfest stakeholders. CSR might 
provide stakeholders implicit property rights – allowing fishermen to demand changes in 
StatoilHydro’s undersea pipeline course for example (though it is unclear which party has 
enforceable property rights on the Barents Sea floor). This social contract, as Coase and 
Schmid note, depends on the magnitude of transaction costs, and as Hanna assessed, 
different values among parties, and different economic valuations.  
With respect to positive “spin-offs,” the marginal social benefit of initiatives that 
encouraged local capacity building, training programs and business incubation in 
Hammerfest were originally underestimated. Discussed more thoroughly later, small 
investments in the community by StatoilHydro resulted in large marginal returns. The 
determination of local actors to pursue benefit claims, or claims to positive spin-offs from 
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energy development as the host community, prompted more local economic development 
than may have resulted otherwise. 
3.3.2 Transaction Costs and Values 
Coase (1960) argued that a Pareto-improving social contract between parties  
would result under the assumption of zero transaction costs. Schmid (1995) underscores 
the importance of transaction costs, noting that they may stand in the way of a Pareto-
improving trade. An example might be the cost of Hammerfest fishermen self-organizing, 
and lost time to their fishing, and thus their income stream. If the cost of self-organization 
proves too great, it inhibits fishermen from organizing a bid for property rights to the 
Barents Sea floor. 
Schmid (1995) notes two more important concepts with respect to transaction 
costs that CSR might address. First, “institutional innovations” might reduce transaction 
costs, making both parties better off. Citing North (1990), Schmid asserts that 
innovations reducing transaction costs are a “source of economic growth because of 
wealth-enhancing trade.” For now, it will simply be suggested that CSR could indeed be 
such an institutional innovation, at least in certain respects. Secondly, he notes that, 
“what appears to be Pareto-better trade between two parties may not be if more parties 
are relevant” (1995:48). In Hammerfest, of course, multiple stakeholders consider the 
impacts from Snøhvit differently, and are therefore damaged differently. Schmid notes 
that, “rights determine who can participate in decision making.” Therefore, assigning 
rights to one party or another risks excluding third parties, like the Sámi potentially. 
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What is not discussed by Schmid is addressed briefly by Hanna (2001): different 
value systems – both cultural preferences and economic non-market valuations - affect 
the degree of harm that parties experience from externalities, thus shifting the marginal 
benefit or marginal damage function curves, resulting in different “socially optimal” 
equilibria for different parties. 
 In Hammerfest, pollution to the atmosphere from CO2, NOx, or to the 
“viewshed,” may be largely acceptable to local suppliers or subcontractors who prefer the 
additional revenue from industrial development. These are values derived from “direct 
uses” that are easy to quantify. The Sámi, on the other hand might consider both direct 
use values (from healthy reindeer sold on the market) or indirect values (from the service 
flows of a clean atmosphere). The environmental NGOs, in addition, represent 
constituents that might have option values (for future, yet unknown flows from the 
marine environment) or existence values (based on the aesthetic or spiritual value of a 
resource, and intergenerational equity). In other words, each stakeholder’s equilibrium, as 
represented in the graphs, will be different. How the community, encompassing all of 
these stakeholders, as a whole adjusts under CSR is also important.  
These different values can influence the shape of an industry cost-benefit analysis. 
CSR, by incorporating stakeholder input, can better account for the different values, and 
therefore the social costs and social benefits accruing to different stakeholders affected by 
Snøhvit development. The result is a more robust cost-benefit analysis that more 
efficiently internalizes externalities (Portney 2005). This premise, however, also hinges 
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on discount rates, or how much a firm, or stakeholder, values future costs and benefits in 
the present day. 
Industry typically discounts a project at a higher rate than a stakeholder because it 
prefers to accrue benefits sooner rather than later. Discounting the future more means 
reducing the value of the future. If industry raises is discount rate, the value of the future 
becomes unimportant more quickly (Kahn 2005). Industry will vary its discount rate as it 
considers capital investments, price changes in the future and other changes that might 
impact its project. This has important implications for cost-benefit analyses, and presents 
one conflict between stakeholders and industry when considering social costs. A 
stakeholder might discount the future much less when she considers future generations, 
or even livelihood, or traditional practices in her lifetime.  
Industry, and its accountants, might be more reticent to embrace CSR initially, at 
least from a traditional cost/benefit perspective. The expected benefits of CSR might be 
realized sometime in the future, while costs are incurred immediately. Costs will also 
differ with respect to the nature of CSR policy. Investments in technology include the 
risks of malfunctions and retooling. On the other hand, CSR and stakeholder outreach 
might limit the risk of lawsuits, and increase the likelihood of social license to operate 
with respect to policy adversaries, local governments or host communities like 
Hammerfest. In the Barents Sea, future development largely hinges on the success of 
Snøhvit and stakeholder buy-in. For StatoilHydro, this means that investment in CSR is 
potentially more rewarding than it is costly. For stakeholders, CSR presents an 
28 
opportunity for their preferences to be accounted for in a more thorough cost-benefit 
analysis than previously possible.
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4 The Political Economy of Norwegian Oil and Gas 
4.1 StatoilHydro and the Norwegian Petroleum Experience 
After the original Ekofisk discovery in 1969, a series of important oil discoveries 
followed that heralded the beginning of Norway’s “oil and gas adventure.” This also 
ushered forward Norway’s elevation from a sleepy, agrarian economy, to a petroleum 
supplier of global importance. 
Statoil10, originally called Den Norsk Stats Oljeseleskap A.S., was created in 1972 
in order to assure a pivotal Norwegian role in developing the proven and recoverable 
reserves of the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). Statoil’s role was supported by a 
state-backed policy that guaranteed the firm a 50 percent controlling stake in each 
production license granted on the NCS, stimulating a speedy coming-of-age for Statoil.  
In 1985, the Storting (Norwegian Parliament) changed the rules regarding state 
participation in Statoil. Two relationships emerged. One continued to link the state and 
the company directly while the other resulted in the State’s Direct Financial Interest 
(SDFI). The SDFI represents a state share of ownership in different interests, from oil 
fields to pipelines and onshore facilities. Like other owners, the State both invests in each 
project and shares in the costs. In return, it receives a corresponding share of the income.  
                                                
10 Statoil is now StatoilHydro - the result of a 2007 merger between Norsk Hydro’s oil and gas division and 
Statoil – the largely state-owned oil and gas company. The merger took place while research was underway 
for this project, but Snøhvit itself was developed by Statoil and other minor partners, and many of the 
developments in CSR and corporate policy took place when Barents Sea operations were conducted by 
Statoil. For this reason, many descriptions, and much of the industry history and data presented here refer 
only to Statoil. When discussing future developments or contemporary policy, including conclusions, the 
operator is identified as StatoilHydro. 
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In 2001, the Storting agreed to sell 21.5 percent of its SDFI holdings, selling 15 
percent to Statoil itself, and moving towards a semi-privatization of the oil company. The 
State continues to control a 70 percent stake in StatoilHydro, however, and avows to be a 
“long-term and stable owner.”11 StatoilHydro is now listed on the Oslo and New York 
stock exchanges and competes equally with other multinationals for licenses on the NCS. 
Statoil, along with successful discoveries and increased production throughout the 
NCS, has catapulted Norway into a “Nordic Emirate” – deriving huge revenues and 
generating wealth for the State. In 2006, the country ranked as the tenth largest oil 
producer and fifth largest exporter. Additionally, it was the world’s fifth largest gas 
producer, and third largest gas exporter. In the same year, the petroleum sector was 
credited with NOK 509 Billion in exports (approximately 100 Billion USD, or fifteen 
times higher than the export value of fish). Petroleum constituted 26 percent of Norway’s 
“added value,” 25 percent of its GDP, 36 percent of state revenues, and 51 percent of 
total revenues.12 Statoil simultaneously reported declining oil production as well - a trend 
in the North Sea that worries some, but gas production has so far offset this fall.13 
The SDFI, or “petroleum fund”, is managed to achieve the “highest possible 
revenues for the government.” It was estimated to be worth NOK 875 Billion (~175 
Billion USD) at the beginning of 2006. It provides a large portion of government 
revenues from the oil sector, while tax rates as great as 70 percent provide additional 
                                                
11 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, “Ownership Policy,” 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/State-participation-in-the-petroleum-sec/Ownership-policy-
2.html?id=445750 (accessed 06.22.2008) 
12 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. “Norway’s Oil and Gas Resources,” 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/Oil-and-Gas/Norways-oil-and-gas-
resources.html?id=443528 (accessed 06.15.2008) and Statoil’s Facts 2007. 
13 Statoil. Facts 2007. 
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revenue. In spite of decreased production on the NCS in recent years, a combination of 
dividends, taxes, and cash flow from a flush SDFI resulted in earnings of NOK 356 
billion, or NOK 80,000 for every citizen (~70 Billion USD, and 16,000 USD per person), 
just this year.14 
4.2 Oil and Gas Policy: A Matrix of Regimes 
In Norway, oil and gas activity and its oversight is the responsibility of a matrix 
of state, regional, and international regimes. With respect to the environment and human 
safety, these regimes employ a number of different policies to promote a “clean” oil and 
gas industry. Taxes are one such measure, while command-and-control regulation, and 
weaker “guidelines,” round out the rest. This section attempts to elucidate the roles of 
different institutions, while considering their effectiveness at promoting environmental 
protection. It shall consider what role CSR might play in addressing institutional 
shortcomings to adequately protect the environment, or communities, from harm. 
4.2.1 State Regulatory Regimes in Norway 
Statoil and its activities are subject to regulation by the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, its Petroleum Directorate, and the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA). The PSA 
considers the health and safety of workers, as well as the natural environment. The 
Ministry of the Environment also oversees petroleum activity through the Norwegian 
Pollution Control Authority (SFT). The SFT monitors air and water quality, including 
                                                
14 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. “Increased Value Creation on the Norwegian Continental Shelf,” 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Press-Center/Press-releases/2008/increased-value-creation-on-the-
norwegia.html?id=511255 (accessed 06.20.2008) 
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emissions from the petroleum sector, and environmental impacts from activities on the 
NCS (Table 4.1). 
Parliament enacted a carbon tax in 1990, and it continues to influence production 
in Norway, leading to carbon capture and storage (CCS) facilities at two drill sites – 
Snøhvit and Ormen Lange further south. Other drill sites in the North Sea are considering 
land-based power sources connected to offshore rigs by cable. This is an effort to reduce 
emissions from oil and gas burning that produces power in situ. Norway is still in non-
compliance with its Kyoto obligations – responsible for CO2 emissions 11% above 1990 
levels in 2005.15 StatoilHydro claims that Norway is the world’s “cleanest” oil producer, 
with emissions per produced oil equivalent being only a third of the global average.16 The 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy dampens the enthusiasm, noting that, “the reduction in 
CO2 emissions per produced oil equivalent has, however, not been significant enough to 
counterbalance the increase in energy consumption due to increased activity on the 
NCS.”17 It added that, “we have seen a slight increase in emissions per unit the recent 
years,” thanks to ageing oil fields that require more energy.18 
The conflicting roles of the state – directly profiting from oil and gas production, 
promoting its expansion in an era of declining production, and simultaneously regulating 
the industry – raises questions about the ability of the state to accomplish both missions. 
Norway is nonetheless characterized by a high degree of transparency and dedication to 
                                                
15 Aftenposten, “Norway Failing to Meet Kyoto Goals,” September 7, 2005. 
http://www.aftenposten.no/english/local/article1110449.ece (accessed 9.26.2008) 
16 StatoilHydro. “Going North: Sustainable Development 2007.” StatoilHydro, p. 12 
17 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, “Emissions to Air from the Petroleum Sector.” Minster of Petroleum 
and Energy. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/oed/Subject/Carbon-capture-and-storage/emissions-to-air-
from-the-petroleum-sect.html?id=443519 (accessed 8.10.2008) 
18 Ibid. 
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the rule of law. It ranked number 14th in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index in 2008, indicating that it is among the least corrupt countries in the 
world.19 
Table 4.1 Regulatory Framework for Oil and Gas and Responsibilities  
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petroleum activities.” 
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accidents and fatalities 
Independent experts 
review reports 
(sources: www.npd.no, www.sft.no, and  http://www.npd.no/English/Aktuelt/Nyheter/fakta_om_petroleumstilsynet.htm) 
 
Though agencies operate independently, conflicts and unbalanced outcomes are 
inevitable. The opening of the Barents Sea represents a set back for environmentalists, for 
example, but a grand opportunity for industry and its supporters in government. The SFT, 
                                                
19 Transparency International. “Corruption Perceptions Index, 2008 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008 (accessed 9.24.2008). Norway 
compares unfavorably to its Nordic neighbors, however, which all rank in the top seven (including 
Iceland). 
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meanwhile, is relegated to reacting to the nature of petroleum development, versus 
helping steer its direction. This phenomenon is not unique to Norway, of course, as recent 
events in natural gas development throughout the Western United States demonstrates. In 
this instance, a highly developed rule of law was circumvented, and corruption pervaded 
Federal agencies in charge of both oversight of, and contracts for, natural gas wells in the 
Rocky Mountain States.20 
Lastly, what Table 4.1 indicates is the absence of a regulatory framework for 
stakeholders harmed by oil and gas production in Norway. This is instead handled by the 
judiciary system, like elsewhere, and recent victories by fishermen in Vesterålen and 
Lofoten demonstrate that, in spite of asymmetries in power, stakeholders can challenge 
oil and gas production in Norway. These were contentious victories, however, and 
pressure to drill in these areas is increasing. CSR, as discussed, could complement the 
above framework, with specific attention to marginalized stakeholders, and by 
preempting legal discord. Where regulatory agencies are inadequate in protecting 
stakeholders from externalities (or in promoting positive externalities), CSR might 
provide additional safeguards for communities. 
4.2.2 International Regimes for Oil and Gas in the Barents Sea 
Norway is also bound by international regulations including the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) and The Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Northeast Atlantic (OSPAR). In addition, Norway currently chairs 
                                                
20 Savage, Charlie, “Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in Interior Department,” New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/washington/11royalty.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=dept%20of%20interior
%20scandal&st=cse&oref=slogin (accessed 9.24.2008) 
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the Arctic Council – an institution with regular publications regarding oil and gas in the 
Arctic, the environment, and community well-being. Nonetheless these appear to have 
little influence on the scope of development within Norway. 
4.2.2.3 Law of the Sea Convention 
 
LOSC provides little in the way of environmental regulation regarding offshore 
oil and gas development for current development in the Barents Sea. Each state has an 
obligation to protect the environment under the treaty. Each state also has a right, 
however, to exploit its resources as it sees fit, and to interpret what level of pollution 
control is adequate. 
4.2.2.2 OSPAR Convention 
 
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Northeast 
Atlantic (OSPAR) is a regional multilateral agreement among Western European states.21 
It essentially combined the earlier Oslo and Paris Conventions and went into force in 
1998; although in many respects it was operational as early as 1992.22 This format is 
much more specific than LOSC, and tackles sources of pollution directly with binding 
agreements. 
By definition, and unlike in LOSC, OSPAR makes protection of the marine 
environment paramount in its goals. Developed shortly after the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, 
                                                
21 Belgium, Denmark, EC, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg and Switzerland as well.  
22 The Oslo Convention was the Prevention of Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft signed in 
Oslo in 1972. In 1974, the Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land Based 
Sources was put into force. They merged by 1992, and operated as one entity even before being officially 
ratified in March 1998. 
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OSPAR specifically evokes the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, and 
the concepts of Best Available Practice (BAP) and Best Environmental Practice (BEP). 
Article 5 and Annex III, in particular, consider “Pollution from Offshore Sources.” 
As a result of its offshore oil and gas industry strategy, OSPAR-members have 
agreed to dozens of “recommendations,” as well as “binding” decisions. These decisions 
affect the use and discharge of different cutting fluids, produced water, condensate, and 
emissions standards. It has also implemented studies regarding an array of environmental 
impacts by offshore oil and gas operations, made inventories of offshore installations, and 
issued reports regarding these issues for public and private consumption. 
From the list of decisions and recommendations on the OSPAR website, it 
becomes apparent that recommendations far outnumber binding decisions.23 More 
importantly, OSPAR does not recognize specific stakeholders or address onshore 
implications. It has not permeated the dialogue in Hammerfest, and is not cited by 
StatoilHydro in its reports. 
4.2.2.3 Arctic Council 
 
The Arctic Council explicitly addresses oil and gas through its different working 
groups like PAME - the working group for the Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment. PAME was established in 1993. It was created with a mandate to “address 
                                                
23 OSPAR Commission, “Decisions, Recommendations, and Other Agreements Relating to the Offshore Oil 
and Gas Industry Strategy, OSPAR Commission. http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/welcome.html (accessed 
31 March 2007) 
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policy and non-emergency pollution prevention and control measures related to the 
protection of the Arctic marine environment from both land and sea-based activities.”24  
Most important in the context of oil and gas are the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas 
Guidelines released in June 1997, updated in 2002, and again in 2008. These are intended 
to create a universal standard for regulation concerning offshore oil and gas development, 
but are also aimed at the industry itself. Section 1.2 states that, “while recognizing the 
nonbinding nature of these Guidelines, they are intended to encourage the highest 
standards currently available.” 
The Guidelines evoke a number of principles common to international 
environmental law: the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, best available 
technology, and best environmental practices. Several sections of the Guidelines are 
dedicated to environmental practices, including “Environmental Impact Assessments,” 
“Safety and Environmental Management” and “Environmental Monitoring” (AEPS 
1997). The document also devotes a section to “Arctic People, Sustainability, and 
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna.” It concludes, notably, with a section on 
“Operating Practices” with clearly indicated procedural suggestions for more 
environmentally-friendly operation.  
The Arctic Council, however, is essentially decorative in terms of policy 
implementation. Offerdal notes that the Arctic Council is an organization “with a 
relatively low degree of formalization” (2007: 141). While there is formality regarding 
membership and decision making, “once the decisions have been made, there are few 
                                                
24 PAME, “Home Page,” PAME. http://arcticportal.org/en/pame/ (accessed 15 March 2007) 
38 
regulations on how they are to be followed up” (Offerdal 2007: 141). Young agrees and 
notes that, “the result is an ad hoc process that is slow and can yield unsatisfactory 
results” (1998: 178-179). Neither the Arctic Council, PAME, nor its Oil and Gas 
Guidelines have influenced Hammerfest development, stakeholders, or industry players 
like StatoilHydro.  
To summarize, there are a number of overlapping regimes that govern offshore oil 
and gas development in Norway. They represent the spectrum of enforceability and 
influence. Domestic legal regimes are most relevant, while the Arctic Council 
“guidelines” make little impact. None of the regimes specify human and community 
impacts beyond an environmental perspective and StatoilHydro does not recognize 
OSPAR or Arctic Council guidelines in its sustainability reports.25 With these 
shortcomings in mind, but recognizing the relative “success” of Norwegian institutions 
with respect to oil and gas regulation, we may look to CSR to fill in regulatory, 
institutional, and market “gaps,” creating Pareto-improving opportunities at the margin 
for different stakeholders. 
4.3 Snøhvit, Hammerfest, and a “New Arctic Petroleum Province” 
Snøhvit is symbolic of a push for Artic resource exploration and development. 
During its development, Statoil faced unprecedented opposition from environmentalists, 
skeptical fishermen, and a wary native population. It also faced new technological 
hurdles that were insurmountable only a decade ago. As mentioned earlier, Snøhvit 
reverses the long-standing closure of the Barents Sea to oil and gas drilling – enacted 
                                                
25 Their insignificance was underscored in interviews with a former Statoil executive (5.6.2008) 
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partly out of concern for the fragile environment, and partly to avoid a disaster like 
“Exxon Valdez,” when an entire fishing industry was crushed by a catastrophic oil spill.  
Decades after its discovery, North Sea oil deposits are clearly in decline - a 
phenomenon StatoilHydro readily admits.26 In fact, global petroleum resources are 
increasingly scarce, and exploration has migrated to both politically and geographically 
challenging territory. StatoilHydro, now an industry leader in offshore development, and 
with a laudable environmental record among oil and gas companies, has openly staked its 
future on development in the Arctic regions (even calling its 2007 Sustainability Report 
“Heading North”). Besides the Barents Sea, StatoilHydro has continued to push its own 
boundaries, securing prospects in the Chukchi Sea between Alaska and Russia, the North 
Atlantic near Nova Scotia, and oil sands in Alberta. It continues to operate in Algeria and 
maintains a stake in the BTC pipeline traversing Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. 
Statoil’s efforts coincided with a new push by the Norwegian central government 
to develop its “High North,” and the county of Finnmark in particular - a region long 
frustrated by a perceived neglect on the part of a southern-dominated government in 
faraway Oslo. The Jens Stoltenberg government, however, enacted a “High North 
Strategy” with a renewed interest in the region’s economic development. Pivotal to the 
strategy was increased oil and gas development, and cooperation with Russia’s northwest 
regions – including its oil and gas sector.  
Concurrently, Russia was contemplating its recent discovery in the Russian 
Barents Sea – the Shtockman gas field – the world’s largest undeveloped gas field at 3.8 
                                                
26 Statoil. “FACTS 2007,” (p. 8) 
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trillion cubic meters of gas (and 37 million tons of condensate). Shtockman is also in 
deep water (~320 meters) and well offshore (~600 kilometers). While Gazprom – the 
Russian energy giant and closely linked with Russian government elite - entertained its 
options, StatoilHydro joined a cadre of eager producers in intense negotiations 
concerning Statoil’s future role in Shtockman.  
These discussions sometimes included state level, bi-lateral negotiations between 
Stoltenberg and then-Russian President Vladimir Putin. After all, it was perceived by 
politicians and public alike in Norway, Gazprom lacked the resources and technology to 
securely tap Shtockman gas (Jensen 2007). While a further examination of this 
relationship is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that the lure of a 
potentially lucrative agreement between StatoilHydro and Gazprom presents another 
motivation – potentially the most important motivating factor - for developing Snøhvit.27
                                                




Stakeholders for this case study were chosen for their geographical proximity to 
Snøhvit, their perceived risks, and their vulnerability to negative externalities.28 The 
following stakeholders correspond to the definition of critical stakeholders discussed in 
the following chapter, though their relevance within the case study varies. They include:  
• The Coastal Sámi 
• Barents Sea Fishermen (The Hammerfest fleet in particular) 
• Hammerfest Municipality and Business Community 
• Environmental Civil Society (NGOs Bellona and WWF Norway) 
Each stakeholder group, it should be noted, is a multifaceted community, and 
differing opinions exist among members of the same stakeholder group. Currently, for 
example, fishermen in the Lofoten and Vesterålen regions of Norway are engaged in a 
contentious dispute with StatoilHydro regarding the safety of seismic exploration, while 
relations in Hammerfest remain relatively harmonious. 
Similarly, the Sámi continue to be divided in opinion regarding their relationship 
with the Norwegian energy firm. All attempts were made to collect as many different 
viewpoints as possible, from as wide and varied a source as possible. These attempts 
brought the author to the Norwegian Foreign Affairs office in Oslo, universities in 
Tromsø, and fishing boats in Hammerfest. In between, the author traveled any 
                                                
28 StatoilHydro asserts that “stakeholders play an increasingly important role in influencing the scope and 
focus of (our) sustainability reporting.” In its 2007 sustainability report, it notes further that, “stakeholders 
relevant to our operations include governments, partners, suppliers, investors and shareholders, customers, 
employees and unions, civil society and local communities.” This is a comprehensive definition. It also 
legitimizes the stakeholders identified in this project, but is broader in scope than this project intends. 
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combination of trains, boats, prop planes, jets, and buses, visiting important towns in 
Finnmark including Alta (the largest town), Vadsø (where the regional government sits) 
and Kirkenes (where the Barents Secretariat is headquartered). The author found himself 
tenting under a ski jump in Vadsø, and was awoken by grazing reindeer in Hammerfest. 
In spite of these efforts, all viewpoints cannot be captured, and this is one constraint on 
the presented results. 
Evidence itself was collected through 35 semi-structured interviews, plus 
additional informal conversations and follow-up dialogues that took place between 2007 
and 2008 with local stakeholders (fishermen, small business/local government, Sámi, and 
environmental NGOs), government officials at the local and national level, Norwegian 
journalists, and with industry representatives in Hammerfest and in Stavanger 
(StatoilHydro’s headquarters).  
The research is complimented by content analysis of sustainability reports, 
official releases and websites from Statoil/StatoilHydro, WWF Norway, Bellona, the 
Sámi Parliament, Sámi University College, and journalistic accounts of petroleum 
development in the Barents Sea. Appendix A includes a list of the different interviewees 
and/or the institution or stakeholder they represented. 
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6 Results 
6.1 Problematisation and Intressement: Statoil Makes its CSR Case  
Actor Network Theory (ANT) defines problematisation as an initial stage during 
which the focal actor (StatoilHydro in this study) defines CSR in a local context. 
Intressement naturally ensues when the focal actor attempts to gain acceptance among 
stakeholders.  
The potential for large-scale oil and gas development in the Barents Sea 
politicized much of the Norwegian populace. Many were instantly skeptical of the merit 
of such prospects, while inhabitants in the North recognized the potential for prosperity 
like that which had taken place in other parts of the country.29 In the many intervening 
years between Snøhvit’s development and final approval, a colorful discourse evolved. 
Statoil, and sometimes the central government itself, generated much of this. As has been 
noted earlier, an “Arctic Energy Province” concept was propagated by the Stoltenberg 
government, coupled with its “High North Strategy.” These slogans clearly played to the 
poor economic situation in Hammerfest, and to the feeling of desperation amongst its 
dwindling citizenry.30 
Statoil pursued a more unorthodox approach during the early problematisation 
stage. Leif Christian Jensen (2007) rigorously detailed the evolution of industry’s 
paradoxical “drill for the environment” stance during the Snøhvit debate. Statoil 
                                                
29 Confirmed in many interviews across a broad spectrum of stakeholders and observers including local 
politicians, Sámi, Fishermen, environmental NGOs and local observers including journalists. 
30 Ibid. 
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effectively argued that the imminent “threat” of presumed-irresponsible Russian drilling 
in the Barents Sea necessitated Statoil to drill first. In this manner, according to Statoil, 
Norwegians could set the bar high by demonstrating safe drilling measures. Though 
Statoil also underscored the potential economic boom to Finnmark (suggesting a potential 
local work force reaching 2000 individuals), it went further by subverting the most 
prominent, and well-organized argument in opposition to Snøhvit; that drilling is harmful 
to the environment (Jensen 2007). This tactic, however, only put Statoil at loggerheads 
with environmental NGOs like “Nature and Youth,” Bellona, and WWF Norway. 
Persistent opposition forced Statoil to reconsider its approach, and its first stakeholder 
outreach initiatives genuinely emerged, and its CSR policies coalesced.  
Across the spectrum of stakeholders already identified then, the principle CSR 
policies that Statoil endorsed, and now StatoilHydro support, are: 
• Stakeholder Dialogue. Maintaining open flows of communication between the 
stakeholder and industry. The corporation recognizes Governments, Partners, 
Suppliers, and Investors and Shareholders as stakeholders. StatoilHydro cites specific 
global institutions like Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights, and the World Economic Forum’s 
Partnering Against Corruption Initiative. It is also a member of the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development. 
 
• Local Development. Generating positive “ripple effects” for the community, 
principally in terms of local business development, specialized training, employment, 
and community development. Its website reads that, “We promote local sourcing and 
work with local businesses as suppliers and contractors where they exist, and invest in 
developing sustainable and competitive local enterprises.”31 
 
• Environmental Best Practices. Employing technological innovations and revising 
industrial practices to minimize, or erase emissions of CO2, NOx, and other gaseous 
emissions, as well as lubricants, hydraulic fluid, drill cuttings, waste water. 
                                                
31 StatoilHydro. “Financial Performance, generating spin-offs and local content,” 
www.statoilhydro.com/en/EnvironmentSociety/Sustainability (accessed 6.11.2008) 
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StatoilHydro touts a “zero harmful emissions” goal, and is developing an 
“environmental impact factor” to measure emissions. 
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6.2 Stakeholder Outcomes: Hammerfest Fishing Community 
Sverre Kojedal, the managing director of Snøhvit who is based full-time in 
Hammerfest, asserted that, “without the agreement of fishermen, there would be no 
development.”32 This claim is being put to the test in the Lofoten Islands, where 
fishermen have staged significant protests in opposition to exploratory drilling. So far, the 
fishermen have succeeded, and exploration is halted for the time being. Both the Lofoten 
example and Mr. Kojedal’s statement confirm the significance of fishermen as 
stakeholders. They are identified with Finnmark, and their success or struggles have 
dictated the fate of coastal Finnmark and its communities.  
Fishing had faired poorly in the last decade. Local fishermen felt under threat 
from larger, more industrial ships based in southern Norway, while a lingering boundary 
dispute with Russia added uncertainty, and Russian trawlers put additional pressure on 
resources. Hammerfest’s population had been declining steadily over the last decade. 
Accordingly, new homes, home prices, and young families were also in decline. Young 
people were not optimistic about their opportunities in the community, and new business 
investment was stagnant.33  
In spite of the documented risks of petroleum development to fisheries, the 
Hammerfest fishing community endeavored to be open-minded; but they were also 
prepared to make overt demands from Statoil regarding specific aspects of 
                                                
32 Interviews in Hammerfest: 6.22.2007, and 7.02.2008 
33 Angell et al. Rapport 2006:6, Samsfunnsvirkninger Fra Første Feltutbygging I Barentshavet, Norut 
NIBR (2006). 
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development.34 They were dismayed with the prolonged economic contraction of their 
community, and of the fishing industry itself.35 “Who knows, maybe my kid will want to 
work at Snøhvit in the future,” an officer in the Hammerfest fishing union wrote36. The 
Hammerfest Fishing Union’s leader welcomed the prospect of new opportunities for 
young people in Hammerfest. “But,” he was sure to add, “we have to be sure that they 
don’t run over us.”37 
6.2.1 Risk and Reward in the Barents Sea 
What risks did Snøhvit pose to Hammerfest fishermen? What were the 
externalities? This section begins to address these questions, while the question of 
magnitude is addressed further in Section 6.3 
Specific risks resulted from negative externalities that originated from issues of 
public goods and open access resources. Damage from a hypothetical oil spill in the 
Barents Sea was perhaps the most obvious danger. Statoil rather quickly dismissed this 
risk because it was drilling for natural gas, and prospects of a Norwegian Exxon Valdez 
disaster were therefore impossible. The company did explore oil production in the 
Barents, from Snøhvit wells, but only after the LNG facility was in place and 
StatoilHydro was well entrenched in Hammerfest.38 Ironically, this did not engender 
much local backlash, but instead created greater economic optimism.39 
                                                
34 Interviews and phone conversation with fishing union representatives in Hammerfest and Trondheim, 
July 2007 and 2008. 
35 Interviews in Hammerfest: July 2007 and July 2008 
36 Email correspondence May 2008 
37 Email correspondence 6.21.2008 
38 Italian energy company ENI is continuing to develop its Goliat oil field, very close to Snøhvit, so the risk 
of an oil spill still exists. 
39 Interviews with Snøhvit observers and stakeholders (summer 2007 and 2008) 
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Other risks to the environment persisted. Contaminated water, hydraulic fluids 
and “drill cuttings” (or the contaminated debris from drilling) could disrupt fishing 
grounds. Even before drilling begins, seismic exploration is potentially harmful, although 
that is debatable. Other environmental risks included debris from increased shipping, like 
bilge water discharge, and waste from platforms. Gas flaring and CO2 emissions were 
environmental concerns, but less so for fishermen. 
Perhaps most potentially injurious for fishermen, and therefore of most concern, 
was restricted access to fishing grounds. The fishermen reiterated on several occasions 
that what they feared most before Snøhvit’s development was losing access to fishing 
grounds because of platforms, infrastructure, or regulation.40 
Positive externalities are more universally shared. In the face of severe 
community decline and depression, fishermen were eager to see economic development 
that would benefit their children and quality of life. 
6.2.2 CSR Applied 
Statoil preempted confrontation with fishermen early, by designing Snøhvit with 
modern technology that included innovative undersea platforms that were 
“overtrawlable.” Statoil was well aware that even the opportunity to drill in the Barents, 
in some ways meant going to new extremes – technologically, and with respect to its 
stakeholders.41 The modern undersea rigs were a positive first step, but issues remained. 
Within the greater and ongoing debate, two incidents are particularly descriptive of CSR 
                                                
40 Interviews in Hammerfest, July 2008. 
41 These undersea rigs have widespread industry applications, and should not be taken as a CSR event 
specifically designed for Hammerfest stakeholders only. 
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in practice, and their resolution provides the most insight into operational CSR with 
respect to stakeholders in Hammerfest. 
 
The Pipeline Debate  
In 2002, Statoil publicly released details of its plan for the undersea pipeline, 
traveling from Snøhvit’s undersea wells to its LNG processing plant on Melkøya (an 
island immediately offshore from Hammerfest). In the opinion of fishermen, the 
proposed path crossed especially productive fishing grounds, including spawning grounds 
for Atlantic Cod. This sparked alarm among fishermen. It was not clear what claim 
fishermen had to the area, however, other than historic use and local knowledge of its 
significance. 
Statoil engaged in debate with the fishermen in semi-formal settings in 
Hammerfest. The fishermen had organized enough to present unified, grassroots 
opposition to the proposed pipeline path. Ultimately, Statoil altered the course of its 
pipeline at additional cost, defusing the conflict quickly. 
 
Ship Traffic Near Melkøya 
In this debate, the fishermen again confronted Statoil after the firm closed a 
narrow passage between Melkøya and the greater island of Kvaløya. While the overall 
diversion it created for fishermen was small, the protests were nonetheless met openly, 
and the passage was reopened for commercial fishing traffic.  
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In this instance, the fishermen bristled at the proposed loss of access, and 
restrictions on their operation. The overall diversion for fishermen was quite small – an 
inconvenience in most respects. But they went into the Snøhvit debate with a few 
principles that were of symbolic importance and dear to them. Issues of access and 
restriction remain particularly emotive. Closing the passage threatened the order of 
things, and gave the appearance that the large oil company was dictating terms to local 
fishermen. This, in turn, was resisted vehemently. 
6.2.3 Analysis 
While the fishermen rather easily entered the enrolment stage of ANT, accepting 
Statoil’s new presence in Hammerfest, the process was not without conflict. These 
conflicts were minimized by early dialogue and continued communication between 
industry and the local stakeholder.  
CSR provided a conduit for communication between industry and the stakeholder, 
and has since formalized the level of self-organization achieved by local fishermen. It 
also resolved a potentially serious conflict over public goods with ambiguous property 
rights. The resolution resulted from informal structures and occurred outside of the 
courtrooms, resulting in mitigated externalities through potentially efficient means. 
6.3 Stakeholder Outcomes: Coastal Sámi 
The Sámi are the indigenous inhabitants of northern Europe, living throughout 
northern Russia, Finland, Sweden and Norway. The largest numbers are located in 
Norway, where reindeer husbandry remains the bedrock of their economy. Norway 
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recognized the Sámi as an “indigenous peoples” by adopting the ILO convention number 
169 concerning “Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.” The Sámi of 
Kvaløya (the large island on which Hammerfest is located), seasonally herd reindeer and 
are referred to as the “Coastal Sámi.” They are differentiated from the interior Sámi, but 
are awarded the same rights as other Sámi under the Norwegian Constitution, Finnmark 
Act, and Sámi Parliament.  
In 2005, the Norwegian Parliament passed the Finnmark Act. This transferred 
approximately 95 percent of the land and water throughout the vast tundra and grazing 
lands in Finmark County from the central government to the inhabitants of Finnmark. 
The decisions was based on recognition that, "the Sámi, through protracted traditional use 
of the land and water areas, have acquired individual and/or collective ownership and 
right to use lands and waters in Finnmark County." The Finnmark Estate Agency 
manages the land. Its board of directors – half appointed by the Sámi Parliament and half 
appointed by the Finnmark County Council – handles property disputes and conflicts 
between reindeer herders and other land users (usually non-Sámi Europeans). No 
legislation provides the Sámi any rights with regards to offshore resources like oil and 
gas in the Barents Sea. Nor is there any legal recourse for demanding compensation or 
royalties for the exploitation of these resources. 
The Sámi have proven themselves adept at self-organization and negotiation, 
giving them a capacity to pursue their interests through Norway’s liberal political 
institutions and social democratic policies that exceed many other northern indigenous 
groups. But this is not to suggest that everything is perfect.  
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In Finnmark, relations between Sámi and Norwegians remain contentious. The 
Alta Controversy (1978-1982) in which Sámi protesting the building of a dam were 
forcibly dispersed, has left lasting scars. Many Norwegians interviewed for this study 
expressed exasperation with the Sámi, their ubiquitous reindeer, and what they view as 
excessive state protection and property rights for the Sámi in Finnmark. Perhaps most 
symbolic of the “annoyance” is a new fence that rings Hammerfest, built to keep reindeer 
out of the village proper. It did not work, since spring snowdrifts allowed reindeer to 
easily cross. A prominent Sámi Parliamentarian called it “illegal”, and compared it to the 
Israeli wall around the West Bank.42 This might be hyperbole, but it nonetheless 
demonstrates the differing perspectives between European-Norwegians and their Sámi 
counterparts. 
6.3.1 Risk Assessment 
The Sámi’s greatest threat is generated by increased industrial activity onshore 
that encroaches on herding grounds (Eythórasson 2003; Vistnes 2008).43 These threats 
can arise from power lines that deliver energy to offshore installations and onshore 
processing facilities, but also from “greener” industries including windmills and their 
service roads.  
The Sámi, who are extremely well-organized and endowed with a higher degree 
of political power than other circumpolar indigenous groups, have kept a very low profile 
with respect to Barents Sea development in many respects.44 Disputed royalty claims, low 
                                                
42 Interview, 6.2007 
43 Interview with local journalist and local Sámi (2007 and 2008). 
44 Interview with long-time Hammerfest journalist (07.02.2008) 
 53 
participation in the development process, and impermanence in the local community, 
combine to erode the legitimacy of Sámi as primary stakeholders, at least as viewed by 
industry and other stakeholders.  In other words, Sámi have arguably less claim, or 
influence, as local stakeholders than other groups, such as the fishermen.  
Sámi are not free from risk from Snøhvit negative externalities, but they are in 
less direct conflict than groups like the fishermen in some sense. Air and water pollution 
are important to the Sámi, but issues like climate change are less tangible, and therefore 
not of immediate concern. Ultimately, it is regional economic development, bringing 
more traffic, industry, installations, and hyttes (small, family getaway cabins popular in 
Norway) that pose the greatest risk to reindeer husbandry, which is the essence of Sámi 
livelihood and culture.45 
6.3.2 CSR Outcomes 
Sámi input regarding StatoilHydro remains mixed, with some local herders and 
Sámi parliament members reporting a positive relationship, and others remaining less 
enthusiastic about the nature of their dialogue with the industry46 
                                                
45 A new report (Vistnes et al. 2008) regarding Sámi well-being in the face of Goliat’s development asserts 
that, indeed, there are great risks to area Sámi from offshore petroleum developments. As described above, 
most problems stem from related onshore activities, and encroachment on reindeer herding grounds. In 
addition, however, Sámi parliamentarians are struggling to find common ground with the Norwegian state 
regarding a new Minerals Act. The crux is language that recognizes their demand for Prior Informed 
Consent (PIC) and consultation before resource development in “Sámi areas.” Another Sámi complaint is 
that the current draft does not compensate Sámi as mandated by ILO 169, article 15.2: In cases in which the 
State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to 
lands, governments shall establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, 
with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before 
undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining 
to their lands. The peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, 
and shall receive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of such activities. 
46 Interviews with Sámi Parliamentarians (2007 and 2008) 
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One prominent Sámi herder and owner of a small Sámi restaurant in Hammerfest 
(a popular tourist attraction) described her relationship with StatoilHydro as largely 
positive, reporting that they consulted her group with regards to the potential course of 
power lines.47 These lines have so far been obviated by the power supplied by Snøhvit’s 
own gas power plant, but could yet be built with future expansions at the plant. Another 
herder, and the leader of a local herding district, was essentially neutral. But others in the 
Sámi Parliament were openly critical of StatoilHydro. They claimed that Sámi were 
treated with contempt by industry. Others cited anecdotal evidence suggesting a 
deliberate effort on the part of Statoil to avoid incorporating Sámi into the stakeholder 
dialogue. Among the evidence was a quote by a Statoil executive that claimed that liquor 
would be enough to “buy off” the Sámi.  
It is clear that Sámi were not a high priority for Statoil during Snøhvit’s building 
phase. In contrast, the Italian energy company ENI, in preparation for the development of 
its offshore oil field, Goliat, delivered an “open letter” that put Sámi in the middle of its 
own stakeholder policy. Interviews at ENI confirmed that Sámi perceptions and needs 
were essential to their own CSR policies.48 The Sámi complaint with StatoilHydro is, in 
part, that they were not included more. But other more genuine threats to their economy 
and livelihood remain unaddressed, and future developments might tip the scale, putting 
Sámi more directly in conflict with development in Finnmark. 
                                                
47 Interview in Hammerfest (07.12.2008) 
48 Interview with ENI Hammerfest manager (07.01.2008) 
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6.3.3 Analysis 
It remains unclear what marginalizes the Sámi in Hammerfest more – the Sámi 
themselves, industry, or a combination. The Sámi are not integrated into the Hammerfest 
political system, and are not directly affected by offshore, or even near-shore 
developments. This diminishes their role as primary stakeholders. At the same time, in 
November 2007, soot from Snøhvit covered both Hammerfest and vegetation where 
reindeer graze around Hammerfest. It was an embarrassing incident for StatoilHydro, and 
was a major news event in Norway. It has also caused serious delays in production and 
exports. This sort of pollution directly impacts Sámi stakeholders, but strangely not been 
a source of contention or uproar.49 Meanwhile, Sámi politicians continue to demand 
royalties from Statoil production in the Barents Sea. From the outside, this has been 
viewed as “having it both ways.”  
The Sámi case is inconclusive with regards to CSR and externalities. The Sámi’s 
own role is less directly affected by negative externalities. On the other hand, another 
group’s positive externalities pose potential risk to Sámi reindeer herders. Statoil (and 
now StatoilHydro) were clearly insufficient, however, in their stakeholder outreach. 
Whether this was a result of the lower Sámi status related to the Snohvit project 
(secondary versus primary local stakeholders) or intentional avoidance, is unclear. 
Regardless, the perceptions of Sámi political leaders remain largely negative. 
                                                
49 During one interview, a local journalist noted that, “the typical perception is that they complain about the 
smallest things, so it is really strange that they were not more vocal about the soot.” 
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6.4 Stakeholder Outcomes: Hammerfest Municipality 
This section focuses on elements of Hammerfest community. It combines local 
business leaders and local government together as proxies for the non-Sámi (and non-
fishing) citizens. Though a representative survey might be preferred, this aggregation of 
stakeholder groups does not negatively affect the validity of the data because of the 
almost uniform support for Snøhvit in the community.  
As discussed already, Hammerfest, like much of Finnmark, was suffering a long-
term economic skid and population decline. The prospects of large-scale employment and 
a revived economy were alluring for locals.  
6.4.1 Risk Assessment: Local Development and Reversing Leakage 
One of Statoil’s greatest challenges was to address the huge expectations that 
Hammerfest citizens had for oil and gas and community revitalization. After all, a new 
“Arctic Energy Province” was being built, and it was starting in Hammerfest.  
A major risk to the community, and one that has occurred elsewhere, would be 
localized pollution which could create increased costs for the community while the 
financial benefit stream flowed to corporate headquarters and investors in the south. This 
flow of money out of a community is referred to as “leakage.” It does not result in local 
development and does little to stimulate economic vitality. An additional risk then was 
the perception of potential economic benefits. Expectations in the community for jobs 
and job creation were extremely high, perhaps unreasonably. 
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6.4.2 CSR Outcomes 
Though success has not come easily, local actors, combined with Statoil 
contributions, have captured more economic benefits stemming from Snøhvit than 
originally thought possible. In 2002, Statoil estimated that approximately 600 million 
Norwegian Krone (NOK) in local contracts would be awarded for Snøhvit construction. 
The rest would come from more specialized suppliers from southern Norway. By the end 
of the construction phase in 2007, there has been as much as 3.6 Billion NOK in local 
contracts, or a six-fold discrepancy in favor of local suppliers. This is largely the result of 
active local organizations and a committed local government, but also Statoil 
contributions to local organizations intent on local capacity-building and education. 
While Statoil may not have adequately contained the expectations of local 
retailers and citizens, it has contributed to specific programs intended to minimize 
economic leakage associated with Snøhvit construction. Unfortunately, detailed financial 
accounting was unavailable to the author but there is qualitative evidence that clearly 
illustrates Statoil’s commitments, and government actions, that extend benefits to the 
wider Hammerfest community. 
 
Petro Arctic 
Petro Arctic is a supplier network “representing the interests of companies 
wishing to position themselves as suppliers to the development and operation of the 
Snøhvit LNG facility and the future expansion project in North Norway and the Barents 
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Sea.”50 In their own words, “The main aim of Petro Arctic is to obtain the maximum 
possible deliveries of goods and services from member companies to Snøhvit and future 
expansion projects in North Norway and the Barents Sea.  This will be achieved by 
marketing member companies to the developers and by motivating and preparing 
members through participation in networking and skills development programmes.” 
Importantly, Petro Arctic is funded directly by StatoilHydro. It includes 350 members of 
large, small, and medium-sized enterprises from the northernmost Norwegian counties – 
Troms, Nordland, and Finnmark. 
Petro Arctic organizes regular meetings that bring together major suppliers, 
representatives of Hammerfest municipality, the local police, and StatoilHydro itself. 
Brief summaries are published online.51 These meetings are centered on issues regarding 
local employment numbers, local offices, local training, and negative impacts stemming 
from exogenous labor supply like crime, housing, and rotating “offshore” work 
schedules. 
 
Pro Barents AS 
Pro Barents is an “industry incubator” partially owned by StatoilHydro that 
similarly attempts to stimulate the Northern economy, supply bases, and oil and gas 
competence. It also invests in new projects, including oil and gas, as well as tidewater 
and wind projects. 
 
                                                
50 Petro Arctic. http://www.petroarctic.no/index.php?page_id=1236 , Petro Arctic (accessed 05.12.2008) 
51 Petro Arctic. http://www.petroarctic.no/index.php?page_id=3788 . Petro Arctic (accessed 07.17.2008) 
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Energi Campus Nord  
StatoilHydro also contributes directly to Energi Campus Nord, an educational 
endeavor based in Hammerfest, but working in conjunction with Finnmark University 
College and the University of Tromsø. The principal goal is to train “high-end, 
knowledge-based” students from the North with expertise in engineering, physics and the 
sciences.52 Oil and gas is a major component of the curriculum, but tidewater and wind 
energy is also important. 
 
Property Taxes 
Hammerfest citizens agreed to a property tax in order to derive a revenue stream from 
Melkøya – the island that Snøhvit is located on. The most recent calculations resulted in 
an annual collection of 19 million Euros – 4 million Euros more than the community had 
originally budgeted for.53 The money is in part already allocated for infrastructure 
development throughout the town, as well as a new, significant cultural center with 
acoustics rivaling Oslo’s National Theatre. 
 
6.4.3 Analysis 
It is evident that StatoilHydro has contributed on a financial level to encourage 
local competency and local/regional development. It also contributes time to stakeholder 
dialogue and feedback at meetings organized by Petro Arctic. But regional development 
is not an imbedded element of StatoilHydro business practice. Instead, Statoil officials 
                                                
52 Interviews: Kåre Tormod Nilsen and Lars Krogh, Energi Campus Nord (07.01.2008) 
53 Barents Observer, “Gas Cash Gives Prosperity” http://www.barentsobserver.com/gas-cash-gives-
prosperity.4493819-16178.html (accessed 06.20.2008) 
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believe that property taxes should be the bedrock of corporate contributions to the 
community, and that other expectations on the part of host communities were 
unwarranted.54 Taxes alone are purely a transfer of money to the community, and do little 
on their own to stimulate growth, or assure community development.  Those goals 
become the responsibilities of local government. In many respects, the industry feels 
distracted and fatigued by different stakeholder demands, and wary of increasingly 
widespread obligations.55 Therefore, although it may seem counter-intuitive, in the 
political context of Hammerfest and democratic Norway, industry may actually prefer 
increased taxes to increased stakeholder engagement. Taxes would simplify the role of 
outreach and community development on the part of industry, placing the onus of 
satisfying stakeholder interests squarely on government. 
One area of business that Statoil did not accommodate, and may have originally 
harmed was the Hammerfest tourist industry. Claiming to be the “northernmost city in 
the world,” Hammerfest draws an unusually robust tourist crowd that comes for midnight 
sun viewing, fishing, snowmobiling, and Sámi cultural tours. During the development 
stage of Snøhvit, Statoil reserved entire hotels for visiting dignitaries and a mobile work 
force. The result was a hotel room shortage that forced bus tours to skip Hammerfest on 
their Finnmark itinerary.56 This seems to have abated, and Hammerfest has retained a 
busy summer tourist schedule. 
                                                
54 Interviews with Sverre Kojedal, StatoilHydro (07.13.2007 and 07.02.2008) 
55 Ibid. 
56 Interviews with Knut Arne Iversen, Hammerfest Turist  (07.12.2007 and 07.01.2008) 
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StatoilHydro admits that community expectations regarding the role of oil and gas 
in community development are still a concern. In other words, can StatoilHydro fulfill the 
expectation locals have of Hammerfest revitalization? Though it claims to take this 
seriously,57 its rhetoric regarding an “Arctic Energy Province” suggests otherwise. 
Industry wants to cultivate the support of locals who support more acreage development 
(i.e. drilling). But since recent exploration has yielded dry wells - and after Snøhvit’s own 
start-up problems - the company is considering how to dampen expectations.58 Statoil 
originally suggested that as many as 2000 permanent jobs would be created by Snøhvit, 
whereas only 300 are actually in place. Therefore, managing expectations may become an 
important aspect of CSR that is yet to be developed: accurate assessments of community 
benefits and project life spans need to be communicated, and post-development 
preparations initiated. 
6.5 Stakeholder Outcomes: Environmental NGOs 
In spite of its critical role in the debate surrounding Snøhvit’s development and 
Barents Sea oil and gas, the environment is poorly represented by primary stakeholders. 
The fishing community, the local municipality and Sámi herders all have environmental 
interests. The fishermen, who most directly overlap with industry in maritime resources, 
are the best proxy for environmental interests on a local level. With their livelihoods and 
resource at risk from poorly regulated oil and gas development, the fishing community 
lobbied Statoil directly for assurances regarding environmental best practices, including 
                                                
57 Interviews with Sverre Kojedal, StatoilHydro (07.13.2007 and 07.02.2008) 
58 Ibid. 
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fluid emissions. The fishing position, however, is a defensive stance to protect self-
interests. While important, it is not a position that challenges industry on technical 
matters, or drives best-practice innovations or development. This is the role of 
environmental non-governmental organizations (NGO).  
Three NGOs were particularly critical of Snøhvit’s realization: Natur og Ungdom 
(“Nature and Youth”), WWF Norway, and Norwegian organization Bellona. Each 
lobbied in opposition to Snøhvit. Nature and Youth were particularly vocal, leading a sit-
down strike in Hammerfest, while WWF engaged in talks with Statoil – each action 
reflecting their respective strategies.59 
6.5.1 Risk Assessment 
Much of the potential risk from oil and gas has already been mentioned – 
emissions from gas flaring, CO2 emissions, pollution from ship traffic, and drill cuttings. 
In addition, it can be argued that NGOs like WWF are fighting for indirect values that 
their members share. The risks, in their opinion, do not outweigh the value of ecological 
services like clean air, healthy fish stocks, and a healthy community. These services are 
hard to quantify. Even harder are existence values. Some WWF members, based in 
distant parts of the world, might intrinsically value a petroleum-free Barents Sea, even if 
they are unable to visit and enjoy it themselves. But these value systems play little role in 
the Hammerfest debate. 
                                                
59 Interview with former Natur og Ungdom leader (08.2008) 
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6.5.2 CSR Outcomes 
In the scant literature that positively reviews CSR, May (1999) complements 
Shell’s model emphasizing local, primary stakeholders in combination with NGO 
engagement and dialogue. Statoil also communicated directly with NGOs during the 
contentious years before the release of the forvaltningsplan, or Parliament’s management 
plan for the Barents Sea and maritime zones around the Lofoten islands.60 Until its 
release there was an indefinite moratorium on oil and gas development in these waters 
with the exception of Snøhvit, which was approved in 2002. 
WWF Norway and Bellona both take credit for the Management Plan’s inception, 
injecting an environmental debate into the popular discourse that had been absent during 
North Sea production. Both acknowledge a relatively open dialogue with Statoil, 
particularly in regards to carbon sequestration, and both organizations recognize that 
Snøhvit was an important instigator that catalyzed environmental opposition and directly 
resulted in the Management Plan.61 Important developments that resulted from the 
Management Pan include: 
• A 50 kilometer coastal safety zone, within which drilling is forbidden. 
• Research of Barents Sea flora and fauna and risks 
• Closed areas (though open for review periodically) 
Another important area that Statoil claims success in is its own campaign to 
reduce the emissions of toxic drill cutting fluids. While pushed by the NGOs, Statoil was 
not under legal obligations to develop such successful alternatives. Statoil has since been 
                                                
60 Interviews with Bellona and WWF Norway (07.03.2007 and 07.04.2007) 
61 Ibid. 
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recognized for its leadership in this respect. Importantly, Statoil acknowledges that the 
development came with “no major cost impact.”62 This is positive, of course, but 
underlines the low marginal costs incurred and relatively high marginal returns. 
Areas of contention that persist include the lack of ballast water treatment by 
supply ships at Melkøya. This was a specific demand by environmentalists that appears to 
have been rebuffed with little explanation.63 Another contentious point is the future 
development of oil. NGOs were willing to accept gas production in the Barents Sea, but 
were adamantly opposed to oil development because of the risk from spills. StatoilHydro 
has since explored for oil in and around Snøhvit, this time with little regard for NGO 
positions. Oil discoveries have not been economical enough to stimulate production thus 
far. ENI, meanwhile, is likely to develop the Goliat oil field nearby.  
6.5.3 Analysis 
Macro environmental issues remain the domain of environmental NGOs and are 
not pushed from a community perspective. The community employs an environmental 
minister, but the person holding this position gushed about Snøhvit, and appeared little 
concerned with specific environmental issues.64 He described his relationship with Statoil 
as informal – fishing trips with Statoil executives for example. He readily dismissed the 
potential for social ills, and even the idea of pollution, suggesting instead that 
Hammerfest was reducing America’s CO2 emissions by supplying them with gas instead 
                                                
62 Vidnes, Georg, “Environmentally Friendly Production Drilling in the Barents Sea: Experiences from the 
Snøhvit Field Development Project 2004-2006 (Deepwater and Offshore Technologies Conference 
presentation. Stavanger, Norway, 2008). 
63 Interviews with Bellona and WWF Norway (07.03.2007 and 07.04.2007) 
64 Interviews with Hammerfest Kommune Environmental Advisor (07.10.2007) 
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of oil. With respect to “environmentalists,” he argued, “if you can’t beat them, join 
them,” and insisted that strict environmental policies were already in place.65 
An ENI spokesman summed up the local scenario more succinctly when she 
noted that, “the environment enters the conversation when it’s convenient: ‘oh yes, let’s 
take care of the environment’…but the real impetus is economic development.”66 Indeed, 
the absence of a locally-based environmental agenda seems to have handicapped any 
influence on the scope of development or the concept of sustainability, and opened the 
door for a “development trap.” For example, StatoilHydro is beginning to argue that if 
Hammerfest expects sustained economic development, then more acreage for 
development is necessary.67 The last point demonstrates the continued competition 
between models of sustainability and economic development. CSR and stakeholder 
outreach, at least in Hammerfest, has not successfully melded the two. 
The position of Oslo-based environmental NGOs like Bellona and WWF Norway 
as “outsiders” was also detrimental to their goals. Hammerfest citizens largely considered 
the organizations as antagonists interfering with the community’s right to economic 
development. 
                                                
65 Ibid. 
66 Interview with ENI spokesperson (07.01.2008) 




7.1  The Influence of Standards 
There are several angles from which to analyze the results of CSR and 
stakeholder outreach in Hammerfest, and potentially elsewhere. First, one can juxtapose 
relevant industry or legal standards that apply to different stakeholders with stakeholder 
concerns. As already discussed, Statoil cites several international regimes regarding the 
environment and health and safety standards. Where do standards overlap with 
stakeholder-relevant regimes? (Table 7.1)  
Specific standards that Statoil cites include the Global Gas Flaring Initiative 
(GGFI) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). These both apply 
more to operations in developing countries. It is unclear how unscheduled and excessive 
flaring from Snøhvit affects “obligations” under GGFI. They are, however, measured and 
taxed under Norwegian law. Important gaps, as indicated in their respective stakeholder 
sections, include recognition of the Arctic Council’s “oil and gas guidelines,” the 
Finnmark Act and ILO 169 - which Norwegian Sámi staunchly demand, but which may 
not be relevant with respect to offshore activities. 
From StatoilHydro Sustainability Reports, it appears that international standards 
have an ambiguous to minimal effect on CSR outcomes in Hammerfest. Beyond their 
irregular citation in reports, there is little evidence to illuminate how they influence 
decisions. Their absence, on the other hand, in the face of stakeholders like the Sámi, is 
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unexplainable, and demonstrates a degree of reticence on the part of StatoilHydro to 
address stakeholder needs. This project recommends more detailed accounting of 
standards, and more specific explanations on their role in decision-making and project 
development. 
 
Table 7.1 Stakeholders and International Standards or Agreements 
Stakeholder 
 













































7.2 ANT in Hammerfest 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) provides a framework for analysis of CSR 
developments in Hammerfest. This project demonstrates the imperfect application of the 
ANT stages to a dynamic interaction between stakeholders and industry.  
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The problematisation stage has already been described in Chapter 6, in which 
Statoil clearly endeavored to define the extent of CSR in Hammerfest. The intressement 
stage is also observable. Statoil’s discourse regarding economic revitalization in the 
North as coupled with oil and gas development has influenced Hammerfest stakeholders 
in favor of Snøhvit development. The subsequent stages, however, are less decipherable, 
and are more a dynamic interaction between stakeholders in the enrolment and 
mobilization stages – fishermen accepting the terms of construction and development of 
Snøhvit for example – and mutiny – as the same fishermen challenge new details like the 
closing of a narrow passage inside Melkøya. Compartmentalizing CSR into neat ANT 
stages is therefore impossible. Instead, a much more fluid, and organic process, in which 
stakeholders continually evolved in their relationship with Statoil. 
 
Table 7.2 Observation of ANT Stages in Hammerfest 
ANT stage Statoil Stakeholder Outcome 
“coexistence” fishing Fulfilled 
Problematisation 
economic developm’t business Fulfilled 
dialogue fishing Fulfilled 
Intresement 
dialogue business Fulfilled 
development fishing Unfulfilled 
Enrolment 
taxes business Unfulfilled 
project developm’t fishing Unfulfilled 
Mobilization 
taxes business Unfulfilled 
n/a fishing Fulfilled 
Mutiny 
n/a business Fulfilled 
 
With respect to Hammerfest business interests, stakeholders also “enrolled” to the 
point of supporting Snøhvit development, but never fully “mobilized” as they demanded 
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more from Statoil regarding contributions to local competence and training. The mutiny 
stage, therefore, becomes a constantly reoccurring phenomenon that advances the 
stakeholder agenda most. The Sámi have benefited less from mutiny, which appears 
immediately after intressement in their case. This, as was suggested earlier, is partly the 
result of their marginalized status as primary stakeholder. 
CSR, then, is more than statements on paper. It is the beginning of a social 
contract; the beginning of a dynamic interaction between stakeholders and industry that is 
continuously influenced by the social, political, and historical landscape at each project 
site, rather than dictations from a corporate headquarters or sustainability reports. By 
incorporating stakeholders into the development process, corporations must expect an 
evolutionary process in which stakeholders, too, redefine the operational context from the 
bottom-up. 
7.3 Costs, Benefits and Pareto Optimal Outcomes 
Gauging whether or not CSR was an efficient tool for minimizing harm and 
promoting positive spin-offs, however, hinges in part on whether or not Pareto-optimal 
outcomes were attempted – in which each stakeholder’s welfare is either enhanced, or at 
least no worse off than before. Specifically, were the incremental costs accrued to 
StatoilHydro for its different CSR initiatives approximately equal to the incremental 
benefits gained by Statoil and the different stakeholders? Did the marginal private costs 
of implementing CSR equal marginal social benefits? The different costs and benefits of 
StatoilHydro CSR policies cannot be readily quantified, but are first discussed 
qualitatively in this section, then further analyzed in Table 7.2 for each stakeholder. 
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7.3.1 Expected Costs and Benefits from CSR in Hammerfest 
When StatoilHydro made changes to the pipeline course and direction that it 
traveled across important fish spawning grounds, fishermen had won themselves a major 
victory by fending off a threat to their access. On the other hand, this change was a small 
incremental cost for StatoilHydro with respect to the overall budget of Snøhvit, and 
resulted in good will and well-developed communication links between the fishermen 
and the company. This in turn leant legitimacy to Statoil in the eyes of local fishermen, 
and eventually won Statoil their “approval” as stakeholders. This is a major benefit for 
Statoil in both the short run and in their long term efforts to pursue development in the 
Barents Sea. 
In a similar manner, implementing CCS technology appeased elements of the 
environmental community, as well as the government and general public. But in the 
context of the overall budget for an LNG facility, these were also small marginal costs. 
The development of alternative, and less toxic, cutting fluids were also low in cost.68 In 
each of these instances, the up-front costs to StatoilHydro were matched rather quickly by 
returns in the form of a social license to operate in the contentious Barents Sea, with 
ongoing returns from gas exports and future developments a possibility as well. 
Stakeholders can use the presence of stated CSR outcomes to hold industry 
accountable, and to argue for more specific results. CSR provides a beginning point from 
which stakeholders can elaborate on perceived harm, or positive outcomes, and means to 
address each. In the process, stakeholders can benefit by collectively organizing. As 
                                                
68 Vidnes, Georg. “Environmentally Friendly Production Drilling in the Barents Sea: Experiences form the 
Snøhvit Field Development Project 2004-2006” Powerpoint Presentation. 
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Portney (2005) suggests, stakeholders can gain access to a “market” in which to express 
their interests with respect to the environment, or other outcomes, that influence 
industry’s more traditional cost-benefit analysis. In the process, stakeholders also achieve 
cost-effective means of influencing the development process. 
As discussed briefly in Section 3.3, the cost of CSR will change depending on the 
project and situation. In Hammerfest, StatoilHydro CSR policies were initially cheap to 
implement – they were simply commitments to “behave responsibly” as an operator. But 
as stakeholders demanded specific outcomes, new costs materialized. For the 
stakeholders, different types of costs develop, but these costs are less onerous and do not 
pose serious obstacles to participating in CSR (Table 7.2).  
 







































































                                                
69Costs and Benefits are labeled as either “Low,” “Very Low,” and “Positive” or “Very Positive” based on 
observations of events described in the text. 
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StatoilHydro had to invest money to accommodate certain stakeholder demands. 
These up-front costs were, at the time, matched by only vague future returns of an 
unquantifiable value. In Hammerfest, however, CCS technology and the pipeline 
alteration were essentially sunk costs, and were easily outweighed by a license to operate 
as discussed earlier. Developments in technology, like over-trawlable, undersea drilling 
platforms for example, are beneficial to fishermen, but are also more efficient and safe 
for StatoilHydro to operate. They do not represent over–investment in CSR, but rather an 
advancement in technology that has beneficial consequences for stakeholders, like the 
fishermen, as well as for StatoilHydro on a global scale. Similarly, expensive 
technologies like CCS advancement are part of a firm-wide strategy. Moreover, CCS is 
more easily incorporated into LNG plants, since the carbon must be separated anyway 
(Heiskanen 2006). Isolating these expenditures as costs associated with CSR in 
Hammerfest is inappropriate when considering CSR costs and benefits there. 
Stakeholders, on the other hand, incur the greatest cost when time is lost from 
business, trade, or livelihood in order to negotiate or organize opposition. CSR, however, 
can minimize these opportunity costs by providing more fluid and accessible 
communication avenues between industry and the stakeholder. 
7.3.2 CSR and Efficiency 
As described above, the costs and benefits suggest that potentially efficient Pareto 
improving trades are made between stakeholders and industry, at least trending towards 
socially optimal outcomes. StatoilHydro experienced low incremental costs when 
implementing the various CSR policies. Stakeholders, in return, experienced significant 
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social benefit (Table 7.3). This is an important argument in favor of CSR as a business 
practice. 
 
Table 7.4 Pareto-Improving Trades in Hammerfest70 




































Pareto improving trades were made among individual stakeholders. If the Sámi, 
currently, are no worse off than before Snøhvit, then a Pareto optimum has been 
achieved for the entire community as defined here. On the other hand, if Sámi are made 
worse off by increased onshore development in the near future, then a Pareto optimum 
may be unattainable. A Kaldor-Hicks optimum, however, in which the net welfare 
increases, even if some individuals lose welfare, is possible. In this case, the Sámi might 
demand compensation for this loss in welfare, like the royalties they are currently 
demanding, returning the community back to a Pareto optimum. 
Neither outcome explains, however, why certain stakeholders were favored over 
others, leaving the door open for a premise based on more basic business strategies. If 
                                                
70 “Low” measurements are based on evidence discussed in the text. Similarly, “High” benefits are based 
on evidence from stakeholders throughout the study. Finally, if Pareto-improving trades were observed, it 
was noted as such.  
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stakeholders like the Sámi are marginalized and do not pose a significant political 
challenge to development, will industry under-invest in CSR strategies that address 
harmful spillovers? It is unclear, but poses a troubling question with respect to future 
CSR development and underscores the “business case” underlying CSR in most cases. 
7.4 CSR and Hammerfest Outcomes 
Has CSR mitigated negative externalities, and supported local development? This 
paper suggest that CSR can reduce negative externalities, and stimulate positive 
externalities at the margin, and that the “business case,” in which the marginal benefits 
are greater than marginal costs to the focal actor, still contribute to the outcomes. Some 
important cautionary notes are warranted, however. 
The results of this study only represent developments up to, and including, the 
first phase of production at Snøhvit. Only follow-up studies will indicate more long-
lasting outcomes. With this understanding, however, it is clear that there have been both 
positive and negative outcomes, but some problems were clearly addressed as a result of 
robust CSR policies on the part of StatoilHydro. 
The CSR definition applied to this case study is a straightforward one: A firm 
implements strategies to reduce harm from its operations – societal or ecological – even if 
not required by law. But the firm’s relationship with stakeholders complicates this simple 
definition, and CSR can become a venue for two-way interaction, instead of the 
traditional top-down vantage point of a benevolent corporation. With a well-documented 
CSR strategy in place, stakeholders can organize themselves in a manner that grants them 
political leverage vis-à-vis corporate actors. From an economics perspective, property 
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rights that did not exist earlier (or were ambiguous) were implied to stakeholders, but it 
was up to the stakeholder to capitalize on this opportunity. 
CSR, although initiated by the firm, provides an opportunity for stakeholders to 
move beyond a defensive strategy, and to make demands on corporate actors to be more 
proactive – e.g. help host communities build wealth rather than simply mitigate harm. 
This realization provides the greatest opportunity for community survival, and even 
growth and prosperity. Actor-Network Theory demonstrates this relationship in 
Hammerfest to the degree that it helps recognize different stages of CSR implementation, 
but it is insufficient for capturing the complicated interaction between stakeholders and 
the industry actor. 
In the Hammerfest case, Statoil had been refining its CSR principles in 
accordance with international guidelines and norms. With respect to Hammerfest itself, 
they remained unspecific, but provided a platform for early and frequent stakeholder 
dialogue. This dialogue is a cornerstone of effective CSR policy, and Statoil 
demonstrated a willingness to communicate with multiple stakeholders - the community 
government and local fishermen in particular, but also Sámi and environmental NGOs. 
Each stakeholder responded differently to Statoil, on account of their different 
needs, positions and goals. Hammerfest fishermen engaged Statoil early, and frequently, 
in order to protect their logistical and ecological needs. But they did not protest Snøhvit 
itself. In many respects, they were in the best position to protest Snøhvit because of a 
resource overlap (the Barents Sea itself), and the potential degradation under industrial 
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pressure. Fishermen in other Norwegian waters are currently protesting petroleum 
development at home, and succeeding for now. 
Hammerfest fishermen capitalized on Statoil’s stakeholder dialogue policy, 
securing changes to an undersea pipeline course, agreements on access to different areas, 
and assuring the use of technology that minimized its impact on the fishery. Statoil also 
benefited by developing positive relations with fishermen and generating positive 
publicity while incurring only minor financial costs.  
The Hammerfest municipality government realized the potential for economic 
revitalization. It also capitalized on open dialogue with Statoil to assure that their 
community would benefit from Snøhvit. The results of this stakeholder-industry 
relationship are somewhat mixed, but largely positive. They also demonstrate that Actor 
Network Theory’s classifications are not rigid. Instead of being a passive actor, and 
accepting Statoil’s definition of community development (property taxes for example), 
the community organized deftly to assure increased local investment. The community did 
not mutiny in a traditional sense then, because they were very much in favor of Snøhvit 
development. Instead they organized different institutions, and collectively lobbied 
Statoil for concrete terms that provided jobs and training. 
7.5 Property Rights and Institutions 
As described above, CSR has transcended a simple policy definition to become a 
social contract that implies property rights to stakeholders where they may otherwise not 
exist in a formal sense. This elevates CSR into a potentially powerful tool for community 
resilience. CSR’s increasingly institutionalized and normalized place in business practice 
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means that even its absence becomes a point of contention, and a starting point for 
community protest and organization. Without well-defined policies, property rights 
stemming from CSR will not be assigned to stakeholders. But their absence presents 
opportunity as well: to demand CSR initiatives, tailored to the local stakeholders, the 
environment and the specific nature of the development. 
As discussed in the “Framework” chapter, A. Allan Schmid (1995) describes how 
the direction of property rights influences how externalities are internalized. Tradable 
property rights grant a certain degree of resource “ownership” to the actor to whom 
property rights flow. If stakeholders obtain ownership of Barents Sea resource, or 
Hammerfest social welfare, then Statoil must either respect this, or pay to overcome the 
assigned property right. The Hammerfest case study does not indicate how transaction 
costs influence CSR outcomes, though it can be used to theorize that transaction costs for 
stakeholders are reduced more than if property rights are strictly assigned to industry.  
The degree of property rights is also a function of “stakeholder relevance.” Neill 
and Stovall (2005) would argue that it is a function of “power.” This project demonstrates 
that, regardless of institutionalization, primary stakeholders under Statoil’s CSR regime 
are inherently “assigned” greater property rights than other stakeholders. In some 
respects, this contradicts the assertions of Munilla and Miles (2005) who argue that 
stakeholder primacy (versus shareholder primacy) permit NGOs and minority 
stakeholders to “force” firms into CSR commitments that are counter to local, primary, or 
even majority stakeholders. In this case study, however, very well-organized groups like 
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environmental NGOs, and the Sámi themselves,71 were less incorporated into stakeholder 
dialogue, and less successful at achieving their demands, than primary stakeholders 
including fishermen and local businessmen. It is unclear if this is strictly a function of 
location (primary stakeholders are integral to the community), or the nature of 
stakeholder concerns with respect to development (Sámi and environmental groups were 
in opposition to Snøhvit in some respects, versus primary stakeholders, who lobbied to 
influence the dimensions and outcomes of development, not challenge its existence). 
The fishermen and local suppliers’ self-organization is also consistent with 
institutional theory that suggests incremental development in response to perceived need 
(Haley 2004). All stakeholder groups in Hammerfest – primary or secondary – 
demonstrate robust institutional performance.72 This partly explains institutional 
effectiveness in Hammerfest, but does not explain differences between stakeholders. 
Again, CSR might partly explain successful outcomes for primary versus secondary 
stakeholders. 
When considering CSR and Pareto optimality, the results suggest efficient 
movements towards more socially optimal outcomes where marginal private costs to 
Statoil are less than or equal to social benefits to stakeholders in places. When examining 
on a stakeholder-by-stakeholder basis, it can be argued that Pareto improving agreements 
were struck, like between the fishermen and StatoilHydro. On the other hand, when 
including the mosaic of stakeholders, Pareto optimality is not clearly achieved. This also 
                                                
71 Sámi institutions include the Sámi Parliament in Karasjok, Norway, the Sámi University College and 
Gáldu (Resource Center for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) 
72 From Haley (2004), “Design Principles” include, “clear boundaries and memberships, congruent rules, 
collective choice arenas, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution mechanisms, recognized 
rights to organize,” and “nested units.” 
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corresponds with Schmid’s (1995) observation that multiple parties complicate the role of 
property rights and their distribution. 
7.6 Regulation 
Companies pursue CSR for a variety of reasons including the right to market their 
“greenness,” inspire/attract/retain good workers, and to pre-empt potentially costly 
regulation (Portney 2005). In the Hammerfest case study, CSR results in efforts to reduce 
discharges to sea and air – including CO2 via CCS technology separating CO2 from the 
well stream (it does not capture CO2 from its gas-fired power plant – responsible for the 
greatest number of CO2 emissions). But when StatoilHydro miscalculated its start-up 
procedures on Melkøya, the result was excessive flaring, soot blown over Hammerfest, 
and more CO2 emissions in one month than had been permitted for the entire year.  
Ardent citizen complaint was met with stakeholder outreach and apologies. CSR, 
besides stakeholder outreach and a verbal commitment to be accountable, could not 
provide any short-term “fix.” The regulatory reaction, on the other hand, included fines 
for excessive emission levels, and increased tax payments because of the state CO2 tax.  
This anecdote simply underscores that CSR is not a substitute for effective 
regulation, and that episodic pollution events like these cannot be avoided (Portney 
2005), though the probability of them occurring can be lowered. CSR can therefore 
complement more traditional regulation, and facilitate compliance (or beyond-
compliance) and reduce the probability of such episodic events by incorporating better 
information.  
 80 
Negative externalities are market failures that exist, in part, because they are not 
accounted for in business practice and operating costs. Regulation is often required 
intervention to help “fix” such externalities. Though regulatory flexibility and CSR might 
be “socially beneficial and conducive to private cost savings through reduced regulatory 
burden” (Esty 2005), CSR on its own seems incapable of internalizing externalities. 
Instead, a “polluter pays” mandate remains necessary and most effective (Esty 2005). 
Early outcomes in Hammerfest support this premise. 
7.7 Limitations and Future Research 
This thesis considers the outcomes of a specific case study, with respect to CSR 
policies in place, and local stakeholders. StatoilHydro, through considered an industry 
CSR leader, has still struggled with corruption, pollution, and questionable investments.73 
This fact simply demonstrates one limitation of my study. Just as Shell CSR was highly 
developed in a Peruvian case study (May 1999), Shell has also been condemned for high-
profile abuses and shortcomings elsewhere.74  
                                                
73 Statoil’s CEO and chairman stepped down in 2003 after an investigation into bribes paid for access to 
Iranian oil fields now referred to in Norway as the Horton Affair. Statoil was fined by Norwegian 
authorities in 2004. The United States Justice Department is investigating Statoil’s ongoing investments in 
Iran to assure their compliance with U.S. sanctions. The firm has also recently invested in Alberta oil sands 
production and Chukchi Sea leases – both considered environmentally sensitive projects. Statoil was also 
held responsible for a 27,500 barrel oil spill in the North Sea on December 12, 2007 
(http://www.sft.no/artikkel____42462.aspx?cid=29292). 
    The Norwegian Pollution Control Authority considered Statoil negligent on several counts, and cited the 
company for insufficient preparedness for oil spills, including poor management and poor equipment. 
Finally, it operates in countries like Azerbaijan, Nigeria and Algeria which all score poorly in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index. Statoil has not been criminally charged in any of these 
regards. 
74 In 1995, the controversial dismantling of the Brent-Spar platform in the North Sea was followed by 
accusations that Shell was complicit in the Nigerian government’s hanging of an Ogoni human rights 
activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, which precipitated consumer boycotts and a large public outcry. 
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The Hammerfest case study, however, might suggest a new strategy for 
evaluating firms. Instead of a macroscopic consideration that heavily relies on self-
reporting and Sustainability Reports, firms could be judged after aggregating the success 
of CSR policies on the ground at each of project site. This might help tailor policies to 
better address local concerns and risks, instead of a headquarter-based policies that are 
less flexible. 
In Norway, CSR has evolved considerably from empty “feel good” statements 
into a more scrutinized practice. For example, ENI’s arrival in Finnmark was 
accompanied by a CSR strategy that, in contrast to StatoilHydro’s, gave a much more 
prominent role to Sámi leaders. The result has been a strange “race to the top,” where 
firms are competing for the best, most effective CSR strategy. As this thesis 
demonstrates, this does not mean that every party will be satisfied, but it is a business 
environment that, if replicated in other locations, could speed and stimulate more 
effective CSR policy by industry. 
Norway’s well-developed institutional capacity, rule of law, and well-defined 
property rights make the Hammerfest case study an inadequate comparison for many 
indigenous communities, or for communities in less developed countries. StatoilHydro’s 
political and cultural ties to Norwegian stakeholders also contributed to the necessity of a 
positive outcome in the Barents Sea, or at least positive stakeholder relationships.  
This project nonetheless demonstrates potential positive outcomes resulting from 
imbedded CSR practices, including the transfer of property rights to stakeholders and 
community political leverage to manipulate outcomes in a community’s favor. This could 
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have implications for other Arctic and sub-Arctic communities - like those in Finnmark, 
the Faeroe Islands, or Bristol Bay, Alaska, where fisheries are encountering increased oil 
and gas prospecting, and environmental, institutional, and demographic scenarios 
resemble northern Norway.  
Future work should include stakeholder surveys that assure a representative 
sample from the community in question, and it might better estimate the cost-
effectiveness of CSR. Quantifying indirect values, like ecological service flows including 
air quality, might better evaluate the cost of pollution events like the soot incident in 
Hammerfest. Willingness to accept (WTA), or willingness to pay (WTP) studies that 
might more completely indicate the economic impact from CSR. Resources and time 
were unavailable for this project to pursue these questions, but they would make a 
significant contribution to CSR literature in subsequent studies.  
This study also took institutionalized CSR for granted, arguing that contemporary 
business has accepted CSR as de rigeur practice. But as corporations from emerging 
markets increasingly partake in global resource extraction – Chinese and Russian 
companies have expressed interest in Alaska natural gas, for example - it remains unclear 
how these same entities regard CSR, and what their increasing share of global business 
means for CSR. Widespread disregard for CSR by emerging companies risks reversing 
CSR’s normalized role in current business. Similarly, recent global financial “shocks” 
have raised questions about the “cost” of socially responsible business practices – still 





The fact that results from CSR initiatives in Hammerfest are imperfect is not 
surprising. CSR attempts to curtail negative externalities, or capitalize on positive spin-
offs, in a pre-emptive manner and cannot ultimately prepare a community or industry for 
inevitable mishaps. This paper nonetheless demonstrates the potential value of CSR to 
communities that confront large-scale industrial development with inherent risks. 
Incorporating stakeholders and their values yields a more complete cost-benefit analysis 
that results in an efficient reduction of harmful externalities and similarly promotes 
positive outcomes. In this case study, the greatest winners were local business groups and 
suppliers who wanted to assure that money and employment benefited the community 
and the region. Less successful were environmentalists and the Sámi. Some of the 
reasons why have been discussed, but these outcomes raise different questions that have 
not been answered: Will this unequal treatment of stakeholders always be the case? Will 
business always be accommodated over the environment, and what if the business is 
inextricably tied to environmental health, or the “business” is a subsistence activity that 
depends on environmental sustainability? 
The outcomes in Hammerfest demonstrate a degree of community development, 
but they do not suggest sustainability. StatoilHydro’s answer to regional stakeholders in 
Finnmark who seek economic revitalization is increasingly: “more acreage.” In other 
words, while suppliers have successfully stemmed the flow of money to southern 
Norway, and stimulated positive economic development in Hammerfest, the local 
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economy is still dependant on a finite natural resource with notable negative externalities. 
CSR, in this case study, has tangible results that minimized risk to fishermen. It has also 
helped position local stakeholders to capitalize on a resource boom, more than they might 
have otherwise. But it is unclear if CSR has positioned the community to weather the 
“bust.” It is also unclear if CSR can, or even if it should perform those functions. In this 
paper CSR was examined under the lens of externalities, to better understand how CSR 
addressed them. CSR, therefore, is a piece – arguably an important one – of a puzzle that 
includes a regulatory framework, strong institutions, and a diverse economic outlook that 
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Appendix A: Interviews 
Institution/Stakeholder (number of interviews) Role / Description 
Hammerfest Fishermen (4) Primary Stakeholders 
Norwegian Fishing “Union” (1) Stakeholder organization 
Sámi Parliament Members/staff (3) Stakeholder organization 
Sámi Reindeer Herders (2) Stakeholders 
Finnmark Fylkeskommune (2) Regional government authority 
Barents Secretariat (1) 
Regional development entity, funded by Norwegian 
government 
Hammerfest Kommune (3) Primary Stakeholder 
Kol Arctic (1) 
Norwegian group encouraging Russian 
collaboration for regional development 
Petro Arctic (2) Local supply and contractor initiative 
EnergiCampus Nord (2) Local Competence / Education initiative 
Hammerfest Turist (1) Stakeholder: local tourist division 
Bellona (2) Norwegian Environmental NGO, based in Oslo 
WWF Norway (2) Environmental NGO, based in Oslo 
Nature and Youth (1) Environmental NGO, based in Oslo 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, High North 
Division (1) 
National Government, with focus on energy policy 
and the North 
Statoil / StatoilHydro (5) Focal Actor / Industry 
Dagens Nærlingsliv (1) Norwegian Business Daily 
Nordlys (1) Finnmark Newspaper 
Northern Research Institute (Norut) (2) 
Social research institute with a northern Norway 
concentration, based in Alta 
ENI (1) 
Italian energy company pursuing Goliat oil field, 
with a Hammerfest office 
North Energy (1) Finnmark-based energy company 
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Appendix B: Snøhvit Timeline 
 
1984 Statoil discovered Snøhvit on the Tromsø Patch in the Barents Sea 
1991-1997 An attempt was made to establish a basis for developing the area. The plan was for 
an offshore field development and gas liquefaction plant on Sørøya near Hammerfest 
that would sell LNG to the Italian market. Statoil halted the planning process, 
citing cost and market factors. A new solution for developing the field was 
proposed, with a facility on Melkøya island outside Hammerfest and subsea 
production installations remotely operated from land. 
1991-1993 Protests against various oil companies’ exploration operations in the Barents. 
Bellona filed suit against Statoil to halt drilling activities. 
1998 New proposal submitted to the ministry in the following year. This included both 
new impact assessments and upgrading of preparatory work done in the previous 
development process. Carbon capture and storage now included in the plan. 
1998-2001 Negotiations and seminars with experts and authorities in Finnmark, information 
meetings with locals in Hammerfest. 
April 2001 New Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) published. 
July 2001 Snøhvit’s partners put the project on hold because of lack of clarity over 
government taxation terms. 
September 2001 Special tax benefits approved by European Free Trade Association’s (EFTA) 
Surveillance Authority (ESA). Contract with partners signed. Statoil submitted a 
plan for development and operation (POD) of the field. 
October 2001 Long-term sales contracts signed with El Paso LNG, Iberdrola, Gaz de France and 
Total. 
December 2001 Due to poor economic situation of the project, Finance Minister announced that 
ways to support the project would be investigated. 
January 2002 POD presented to Parliament. Environmentalists organize intensive protests. 
March 2002 POD for LNG plant approved by Norway’s Parliament in March 2002. Statoil 
announces that tax position is unclear due to the involvement of the ESA. 
May 2002 Pollution Control Authority allows Statoil to start construction work (preparation 
of the site and filling of land). 
July 2002 Resolution of the tax position by the ESA. 
August 2002 Statoil announces that delays caused by the ESA tax investigation have increased 
costs by ? 130 million. 
October – 
December 2002 
Following a detailed project review, CEO says that the project’s management and 
organization need to be strengthened to ensure cost control and progress: costs have 
risen by ? 740 million, to 5.75 billion. 
June 2003 EFTA Court rules against Bellona’s action against the ESA. 
2004 Following an ‘extraordinary review’, Statoil’s board is notified that costs could 
rise by a further ? 510-760 million. Risk of delay by 6-12 months. Measures 
implemented to deal with failures by contractors and equipment suppliers. Statoil’s 
cost overruns discussed in the Oil and Energy Ministry and Parliament. 
June 2005 Partners launch studies to assess doubling the plant’s capacity. 
July 2005 Hammerfest Energi submits EIS for 100 MW power plant to Pollution Control 
Authority, and complains in public that Statoil has refused to contribute to its 
project. 
 
September 2005 New review reveals that cost estimates have risen and further delays are expected. 
Cost estimate rises to ? 7.42 billion. Deliveries scheduled to begin in December 
2007. Statoil starts to secure alternative supplies for US and Spanish customers. 
November 2005 Remote control system and power relay tested and remote monitoring system in 
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operation. 
January 2006 Statoil announces that it will re-evaluate whether oil production from the Snøhvit 
field could be profitable. 
March 2006 Shell and Statoil sign an agreement to work towards developing the world's largest 
project using carbon dioxide (CO2) for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) offshore. 
Gassnova is awarded funding to test and verify Hammerfest Energi’s carbon 
scrubbing technology. 
October 2007 The first vessel with a cargo of liquefied natural gas from the Snøhvit field leaves 
port at Melkøya. 
August 2007 Snøhvit comes on stream. 
August 2007 Soot incident: Emissions from excessive flaring condense and cover the community 
in black “soot,” leading to public irritation and confusion. Public meetings follow. 
November 2007 Leak in cooling system leads to closure. 
January 2008 StatoilHydro gives SFT an update on the emissions of CO2, NOx, CH4, VOC, 
soot and PAH from the initial the start-up period. The company estimated that 
there may have been “extraordinary emissions” of up to 1.5 million tons of CO2 
and 2200 tons of soot from flaring from the LNG plant in this period. StatoilHydro 
will buy emission credits for the carbon emissions. 
February 2008 The Bellona Foundation sues StatoilHydro over alleged violations of Norwegian 
environmental law in the Snohvit project. The foundation agued that the oil major 
is not entitled to restart production of LNG in the Snohvit project before an 
application for more emissions is approved. StatoilHydro restarted production of 
LNG in the Melkøya plant, but the application to the Norwegian Pollution Control 
Authority had not yet been approved. 
March 2008 Cooling system difficulties close plant again. 
July 2008 Opens at 60 % capacity 
Source: BarenstObserver.com and based on the timeline developed by Heiskanen (2006) 
 
 
